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I- IH1E0D0CTI0H
A. BASIC PBCB1IM DEFIHITIOF
la the past 35 years, a number of papers and reports,
both classified and unclassified, have been published on the
missile allocation problem. This prollem can be stated very
simply as follows:
Given an existing weapon force and a set of targets, what
is the 'optimal' allocation of weapons to targets?
The problem can be analyzed from two perspectives:
• that of the defender, in which case the problem
concerns the optimal allocation of defense missiles for
the defense of a single target or a group of targets,
or
• that of the attacker, in which case the problem
ccncerns the optimal allocation of weapons to attack
the targets and possibly the defense systems.
There are many elements that comprise the missile allo-
cation problem. These elemerts can be broadly divided into
six groups:
• the attacking force,
• the defending force,
• the target complex,
• intelligence available to both forces,
• scenario of the battle, and
• the criterion upon which the effectiveness of the
weapon allocation strategy is based.
Ihe specification of the parameters of these six
elements determine the complexity, nature and scope of the
particular allocation problem. The solution is a weapon
allocation strategy that optimizes the objectives set forth
by the force seeking the allocation strategy.
B. POEPOSE
Ihis thesis is motivated by the author's interest in
the field of air defense and missile defense systems. Air
defense is of particular importance to a small country like
Singapore, the authors homeland, where vital military
installations and industrial centres are located very close
to one another geographically- It is thus especially vulner-
able to a concentrated attack of enemy aircraft that can fly
at low altitude and unmask cnly at a close proximity to the
intended targets before unloading their ordnance. The other
motivation is that the analysis of the missile allocation
problem from a mathematical viewpoint necessitates the use
of maay optimization technigues, such as linear and nonli-
near programming, stochastic dynamic programming, game
theory and Monte Carlo methods, that form the core of a
traditional Operations Research study. As such, the missile
allocation profclem is a good example of the kind of problem
that is amenable to analysis by Operations Research
technigues.
C. SCOPE AHE CEGANIZATIOH
The scope of the thesis can be delineated as follows:
• the investigations and results presented are all drawn
from the unclassified literature, due to a lack of
access to the classified papers.
• no detailed mathematical proofs and derivations are
given for most results given. However, the interested
reader can examine the original references for more
details.
• emphasis is given to results obtained from analytical
means rather than from computer simulation. In studies
v*hich consider realistic situations, the resulting
aathematical analyses are usually so complicated that
it is necessary to resort to Monte Carlo simulation in
order to obtain numerical results. The restrictions on
computer time usually dc not permit extensive varia-
tions in parameters in order to find an optimal solu-
tion or to conduct sensitivity analyses.
• studies pertaining to specific weapon systems are not
included here, in line with the general appeal of this
subject.
Chapter 2 presents the missile allocation problem in
terms of its components. Terms and nomenclature pertaining
to this field of study are given as an aid to understanding.
The common notations used in later mathematical formulations
of the problem are also given.
Chapter 3 gives a general overview of the investigations
and results concerning the missile allocation problem prior
to the publication of the monograph by Eckler and Burr
[Bef. 1 ] on this subject. This publication can be considered
a landmark as it is the first comprehensive survey of the
literature on the missile allocation problem and a compila-
tion cf the results obtained in a more or less logical
fashion. A tctal of 138 references are cited therein. Matlin
[Bef. 2] is the only author prior to that monograph tc
attempt a general survey of the missile allocation problem.
He presented a tctal of 40 papers and reports in abstract
form with no analytical results or mathematical derivations.
The source of the material presented in Chapter 3 is the
monograph putlication, and the analytical results given form
a basis for the further results obtained in the survey by
the author of the recent (post 1972) literature on the
missile allocation problem. These results are presented in
Chapter 4, which forms the core of the thesis.
II, THE HI5SIIE A1LQCATICH PROBLEM
A. IHTBODUCIIOH
In this chapter, the basic missile allocation problem is
presented in its simplified form as essentially a stochastic
duel between an attacker and a defender, each possessing a
stockpile of missiles. The defender defends a single target
or a group of targets with surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and
the attacker uses tactical missiles that may be aimed at the
targets, or at the SAM systems, with the basic objective of
destroying as many of the targets as possible. The basic
missile allocation problem is the determination of an
optimal defensive and/or an optimal offensive strategy that
can be described by the number and type of missiles to be
allocated to each target cr groups of targets, and the
firing policy for these missiles so as to minimize (for the
defender) or maximize (for the attacker) the destruction cf
the targets.
The richness and complexity of the missile allocation
problem is a consequence of the multitude of factors that
bear an this problem, and the influence their parameters
have on the determination of the allocation strategy. These




• intelligence available en the opposing force,
• scenaric, and
• aeasure of effectiveness of the allocation strategy.
The specifications of and assumptions made for each of
these elements in a particular study into the missile
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allocation problem will determine the degree of complexity
and realism of the situaticc it portrays, and ultimately,
the optimal allocation strategy that is sought.
B. EIEMENTS OF THE HISSILE A1L0CATICH PROBLEM
1 . Attacker
The attacking force, which is assumed to be long-
range tactical missiles in icst of the literature related to
this subject, can be specified by three main characteris-
tics :
• weapon types,
• weapon capabilities, and
• attack strategy.
Each of these characteristics is elaborated on in the
following three subsections.
a. Weapon Types
lie attacking fcrce can be composed of just a
single type cf weapon or a lumber of different weapon types.
A single weapon type means that each individual missile has
the same physical and performance characteristics such as
size, weight, range, accuracy, radar signature, payload and
yield, reliability and availability, and will be treated as
identical entities in the analysis. The attacking force can
also comprise of a mix cf different weapon types with
different paylcads, targeting accuracies, yields, etc., or a
mix of real missiles and decoys, which are 'dummy 1 missiles
used to deceive the defense and derive benefit through the
exhaustion effect or the saturation effect. The decoy is
just in example of a penetration aid for the actual weapons
that axe aimed at the targets. These penetration aids
facilitate the penetration of the main weapons through the
defensive systems to the intended targets. Other penetration
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aids include weapons targeted at the defense systems, chaff,
precursor, and ECM.
b. weapon capabilities
The ability of the attacking weapon to destroy a
target that it is aimed at depends on its performance char-
acteristics vi2„:
• maximum range of the weapon,
• aiming accuracy of the weapon,
• availability of the weapon for launch,
• reliability of the weapon- whether it can reach its
target without degradation in payload or accuracy,
• deliverable payload cf the weapon- the number of
warheads that the delivery platform can carry,
• yield cf the weapon- destruction capability of the
warheads, and
• survivability of the weapon- can be affected by such
factors as its radar signature, flight profile, or
speed.
In many analytical studies, these individual
factors are lumped together into parameters that reflect
their combined effects, e.g. the availability, reliability
and accuracy of a weapon may be expressed as a single quan-
tity called probability of reaching the target that it is
aimed at, while the payload and yield of the weapon may be
combined together with the hardness of the target into a
single parameter called the radius of effectiveness of the
weapoa. These 'convoluted' guantities may simplify subseq-
uent lathematical analyses considerably, but they should be
used with cauticn for two reasons:
• they are not physical quantities that are directly
aeasureable, and to obtain numerical values for them in
specific cases may involve tedious experimentation and
gathering of data.
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• the way that the physically unequal componental factors
are combined into a single quantity may also be subject
to debate as to their relative weights.
c. Attack Strategy
The attack strategy can be seen in terms of
three dichotomies. The first is concerned with whether a
single simultaneous attack cf all weapons is utilized or
whether the attack is sequenced in several waves, which may
be equally or unequally spaced in time. The successive wave
attack is normally accompanied by assessments of the attack.
The attacker may observe the impact points of his weapons
and adjust the aim-points of subsequent weapons accordingly
to cojpensate for aiming errors or dispersion effects. He
may alsc perform a damage assessment at the end of each
wave, and aim his weapons only at surviving targets in
subseguent attacks. The former assessment is termed a
'shoot-adjust-shoot' strategy, while the latter is termed a
'shoot-look-shoct » strategy.
The second dichotomy is whether the attacker
fires at all available targets or just a subset of the
target group. Different targets may have different values,
and may have associated with each a different kill prob-
ability depending on characteristics of the target such as
its hardness, location, existence and type of terminal air
defenses, etc. If the objective of the attacker is to
maximize target value destroyed with a limited stockpile cf
weapons, he may consider firing at only that subset of
targets which have the highest values and kill
probabilities.
Another consideration for the attacker is the
allocation of his weapons to targets and defense systems,
which may include defense radars, command-and-control
centres or missile silos. The attacker may choose to fire
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part of his weapons at the defense systems in an effort to
destroy them and thus increase the probability of subsequent
weapons penetrating the defenses and reaching their targets.
The optimal allocation of weapons to value targets and
defense system targets under different assumptions and
conditions comprise one class of the missile allocation
pro blem.
lor an attacker who is concerned with maximizing
target destruction at minimum economic cost, a possible
attack strategy is to use a mixture of real missiles and
cheaper decoys, or to substitute better (in terms of
performance) but more expensive missiles with a numerically
greater force cf cheaper lissiles of relatively inferior
performance. By using this strategy. The attacker hopes to
bring into play two effects that degrade the capability cf
the defense tc counter the attack. These two effects are:
• exhaustion effect: by firing a larger number of weapons
against a fixed stockpile of defensive missiles, the
attacker tempts the defender to use up all of his
lissiles, i.e. to exhaust his stockpile before the
attacker exhausts his supply of weapons. At that point,
the targets become undefended and would be more
vulneratle.
• saturation effect: a defense system is said to be in a
state of saturation if the number of attacking weapons
arriving simultaneously within its coverage envelope is
greater than the number which it is capable of
engaging. Thus the defense has to select a limited
number of cf attackers to engage while the rest of the
intruders are allowed to penetrate the defense unhin-
dered (leakage). By having a numerically larger force
of weapons, the attacker hopes to induce this condition
during his attack on the targets.
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2. Defender Characte ristics
The defending force, assumed to be surface-to-air
(SAM) nissile systems in general, can be specified in terms
of two major characteristics:
• jissile types and capabilities, and
• defense strategy.
Each of these characteristics is elaborated on in the next
two subsections.
a. Missile Types and Capabilities
The defending force may be comprised of just a
single type of defense missile or of different types of
missiles of different ranges, coverages and reliabilities.
Here, reliability of a missile means the probability of
destroying an attacking weapcn it is assigned to, and takes
into account such parameters as the probability of
successful launch, probability of successful intercept, and
probability of kill given intercept, which depend on missile
performance specifications. Many defense studies postulate
the availability of two types of defense missiles of
substantially different coverages:
• a local missile, which can defend against weapons
directed at a single target (terminal defense) , and
• an area missile, which has a bigger coverage and can
defend against weapons directed against one of a group
of targets in an extended region (area defense).
b. Defense Strategy
Ihe appropriate (or optimal) defense strategy
depends greatly on what the defender knows about the
offense's plans, capabilities and resources. Given the
extent of intelligence about the attacker, and the resources
he possesses, the defensive strategy can be dichotomized in
several ways.
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Ihe first dichotomy is preallocation strategy
vs. non-preallocation strategy. In the former case, a speci-
fied number of missiles is assigned to the defense of each
target, depending on its value. ^reallocation defenses
require that the defense keep track of exactly how many
attacking weapons have been directed at each target in order
to decide whether or not to allocate a missile against the
next weapon approaching the target. When this is not
possible, a non-preallocaticn strategy (or group preferen-
tial strategy) may nonetheless be possible, wherein the
target group is divided into disjoint subsets, and a frac-
tion of the defense stockpile is allocated to each of the
target subsets.
Ihe second dichotomy concerns the allocation
between local (terminal) and area missiles. Each target can
be defended by a mix of local missiles which are allocated
to it prior to the attack, and area missiles which can cover
any target within some region of protection. The defense
strategy in this case is concerned with the relative numbers
of each type to be allocated to the target and the firing
policy
.
Ihe third dichotomy is concerned with whether
the dafensive strategy is target-oriented or attacker-
oriented. In the former case, the defender allocates
missiles to specific targets. In some cases, the defender
may not be able to determine which target a weapon is
directed against in time tc make an intercept if desired
(attack evaluation). In such a situation, the defender must
use an attacker-oriented strategy instead, whereby missiles
are assigned tc each incoming weapon.
3- Target Characteristics
The target can be characterized by:
• type of target,
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• value assigned to the target, and
• defenses associated with the target.
a. Type of Target
A simplifying assumption made in most analyses
of 'the missile allocation problem is that targets are either
classified as point targets or area targets. A target is
considered a point target if the lethal radius of the
attacking weapon is large encugh relative to the size of the
target so that a single weapon can destroy the target
entirely. If more than one weapon is required to cover the
target, it is considered an area target. Examples of area
targets are a large airbase, a city, or a harbour. However,
an area target night be considered to be a collection of
point targets if it can be broken down into individual aim-
points with values associated with each point rather than
with the target as a whole.
A target is considered to be independent of
other targets if no single attacking weapon can destroy more
than one target at a time, whereas collateral targets can be
killed by a single weapon.
b. Value of a Target
Ihe value of a target is an important considera-
tion in the missile allocation problem because the usual
objective or measure of effectiveness used in the compari-
sion of alternative allocation strategies is the expected
target value destroyed. In most cases, it is assumed that
the value or military worth associated with a target is the
same as perceived by the offense as for the defense,
althoagh in reality it probably is not. Again in most anal-
yses, a single parameter is used to determine the value of
the target, e.g. the population of a city target, although
in reility, several factors may be of important strategic
17
value, e.g. the industrial capacity and military installa-
tions, in addition to the population.
Ihe value of a target may be constant with time,
e.g. an ammunition production plant, or it may vary with
time, e.g. an airbase from which aircraft are taking off, or
a city whose population is being rapidly evacuated. The
value scales are usually assumed to be linear, implying for
example that a city with two million people is twice as
valuable as a city with one Billion people, all other things
being egual, an assumption that is generally inappropriate.
A target may have an indirect value in the sense
that no value is assigned for destroying it, but if it is
eliminated, it becomes easier to accumulate direct values
from other targets. Indirect valued targets are sometimes
called secondary targets, whereas direct valued targets are
called primary or value targets. Examples of secondary
targets are defensive missile silos, air defense radars, and
command-and-ccntrcl centers.
c. Eefenses Associated with the Target
A target may either have no defenses at all, or
terminal defenses only, area defenses only, or a mixture of
both types of defenses. In models which treat the defenses
implicitly, the defensive capability of a target is given by
that target's penetration probability (or probabilities for
combined area and terminal defenses). Where a number of
separate defense regions are considered, a region consisting
of a subset of targets defended by a single area defense,
the defenses in one area cannot be used in another area, and
probabilities of penetrating each region are specified sepa-
rately. Defense regions may overlap to some extent so that
some targets are contained in more than one defense region.
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4- Intelligence Available on the Opposing Force
The knowledge that each side has regarding the
opposing force, its size, capabilities and intentions deter-
mines to a large extent the optimal strategy to employ
against this force. In all studies on the missile allocation
problem, assumptions are made as to the extent of informa-
tion the attacker and defender has on each other's stockpile
size and weapon composition, allocation strategies, and the
results of such strategies. Specifically, the intelligence
that each side has of its opponent can be delineated as
f allows:
• the total numbers and types of weapons that the oppo-
nent possesses, or if the exact numbers are not known,
the probability distribution of the force size;
• the reliabilities of the missiles, given generally as
the probability that a defensive missile will intercept
and destroy an attacking weapon, or the probability
that an attacking weapon will reach and destroy ac
undefended point target;
• the impact points or probability distribution of impact
points of the attacking weapons, and their lethal
radii, and
• target danage evaluation, if the attack occurs in
successive waves i.e. determine which targets have
already been destroyed and allocate missiles or weapons
only to surviving ones (shoot-look-shoot strategies)
.
The most complete intelligence is obtained when one
side can see the entire allocation of the opposing force's
stockpile to targets before making its own allocation, i.e.
the opposing force's strategy (allocation and firing policy)
is known beforehand. If the offense has this knowledge, an
offense-last-move situation exists, and similiarly, if the
defense possesses this intelligence, a defense-last-move
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situation is present. On the other end of the scale, the
offense and defense may allocate their resources each in
ignorance of the other •s allocations. This allocation
problai can in general be formulated as a two-person- zero-
sum game.
5. Scenario
A major portion of tfce studies on the missile allo-
cation problem have been devoted to strategic weapons
exchanges between two superpowers. Since strategic nuclear
warfare remains outside the realm of military experience,
models are proposed and analyzed to provide decision makers
with information on possible consequences of policy deci-
sions on the deployment and employment of strategic nuclear
weapons.
The scenario usually considered is based on the
precept of lutual deterence, i.e. the threat of massive
nuclear retaliation to deter aggression. To achieve this,
each side maintains a massive and secure strategic force
that is expected to retain its capability of delivering a
devastating retaliatory strike despite an all-out enemy
first strike intended to reduce the retaliatory force
(assured destruction policy)
.
Most studies assume a two-strike nuclear exchange,
in which each side possesses two kinds of assets:
• several types of strategic weapons with which each side
can strike at the other, e.g. land-based ICBM's,
submarine-tased SLBM's, or long-range nuclear bombers,
and
• value assets, consisting of industrial, economic and
governmental facilities and population that contribute
to a society's economic viability. By attacking these
targets, each side aims to destroy the other as a
social and economic entity.
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The first striker can allocate his strategic weapons
against his opponent's strategic arsenal in a counter force
attack in order to reduce the expected retaliatory damage to
himself, or he may target his opponent's value targets,
thereby fulfilling the gcal of damaging his economic
viability in a countervalue attack, or he could mix counter-
force and countervalue options to obtain an optimal
targeting strategy based on some objective function. Because
a two-strike exchange is assumed, there will be no further
strikes after the other side retaliates. Therefore the first
striker allocates all his weapons in a first strike, and his
opponent retaliates with all his weapons against value
targets only.
This basic scenario can be enriched by considering
reserve forces, or more than two sequential strikes.
Selective threat targeting and progressive confrontation
targeting may also be considered as alternative scenarios of
the real world situation.
6« Measures of Effectiveness of the Allocation Strategy
The criterion of effectiveness used to compare
alternative strategies or to find an 'optimal' strategy in a
given situation is determined by the decision maker faced
with the problem. The choice of an appropriate measure of
effectiveness (MOE) is determined largely by the physical
parameters of the problem, such as relative stockpile sizes,
nature of the targets, degree of knowledge about the oppo-
nent's weapons and allocation strategy, as well as political
objectives and subjective perceptions. Such a choice may
depeni largely on intuition, and hence be somewhat arbi-
trary. In many studies, a particular MOE is chosen for its
mathenatical tractability rather than its closeness to real
political objectives.
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The KOE's normally used in missile allocation prob-
lems are:
• probability of target destruction- this MOE is appro-
priate if the target ccrsists of a single point;
• expected target value destroyed- this MOE is suitable
if the target is an area target or a composition of
many point targets, and both sides know the size of the
opponents stockpile;
• expected number of attacking weapons not intercepted by
the defense- this MOE is used because the expected
target value destroyed is directly related to the
number cf penetrating weapons;
• expected target value surviving a certain percentage of
all attacks of a given size- in some instances, this
MCE is used. It is more difficult to deal with analyt-
ically; however it is easily evaluated using Monte
Carlo methods;
• probability that no target value is destroyed- this MOE
is appropriate if the number of defensive missiles
available to a target is greater than the number of
attacking weapons directed at the target, and the
nature of the target is such that even a relatively
small amount of damage inflicted would be as cata-
strophic as a large amount of damage;
• expected cost of achieving destruction of the target-
this MOE is used in a situation where the offense is
net restricted to a number of attack waves, but could
continue with the attacks until the target is
destroyed. This attack strategy is used in the case
where the operational value or worth of the target is
very high and the number of weapons that the attacker
can expend on its destruction is practically unlimited;
• expected lumber of weapons expended until the first
penetrator- this MOE is suitable if the attacker fires
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one weapon at a time against the target and the defense
has no information about the size of the offense stock-
pile. In this situation, it is not possible for the
defense to design a strategy which minimizes the
expected fraction of targets destroyed or to maximize
the protability that nc target value is destroyed-
• expected target value extracted per offensive weapon
fired- this M03 is appropriate if the defense designs a
strategy such that the expected fraction of targets
iestroyed is proportional to the attack size. These are
also known as 'Prim Read* deployments.
The selection of an appropriate MOE is important in
the missile allocation problem because the optimal alloca-
tion strategy in most cases depends critically on this
choice. In some situations however, different criteria of
effectiveness lead to the same allocation strategy or lead
to siiiliar results.
C. TEEHINOLCGT ABD HOTATI01
The terminology and notation used throughout this thesis
will be consistent in the mcst part with those used in the
monograph of Sckler and Burr. This will provide a sense of
continuity in going from Chapter 3, in which an overview of
the cre-1972 investigations into the missile allocation
problem is presented, with material largely extracted from
Eckler and Burr's publication, to Chapter 4, which gives the
results of studies done subsequent to the publication of the
monograph.
Most of the terminology related to the missile alloca-
tion problei has been articulated and explained in the
previous secticns of this chapter, when the elements of the
missile allocation problem are descrited. Nevertheless, it
is worthwhile tc summarize the salient terms here to avoid
any confusion.
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In a typical situation, the offense has a stockpile of
weapons which are used tc attack a target or targets
belonging to the defense. The defense has a stockpile of
missiles which can be used to intercept the attacking
weapons. The targets may he either point targets, any of
which can be destroyed by a single weapon, or area targets,
which require several weapons to destroy. A missile has an
inherent reliability or probability that it will destroy the
weapon it is assigned to. A weapon in turn has a weapon kill
probability, which is the probability that it will destroy
the target it is aimed at if it is not intercepted by a
defense missile. The value cf a target is the military worth
assigned to it and is assumed to be the same from both the
offense's and the defense's point of view. The attack can
occur simultaneously in a salvo, or it can occur in several
successive waves separated in time. Sequential attacks on a
target makes possible damage assessment and leads to shoot-
look-shoot strategies.
The most common symbols used in the analyses presented
later are given below. Other notation peculiar to a partic-
ular analysis will be given as required.
A = total numter of weapons in the offense stockpile,
D = total number of missiles in the defense stockpile,
T = total number of targets,
a = A/T = normalized offense stockpile on a per target
basis,
d = D/T = normalized defense stockpile on a per target
basis,
p = weapon kill probability,
f = missile reliability,
q = 1-p = probability an unintercepted weapon fails to kill
its target,
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q, = 1-p (1-j>) = probability that a weapon to which a aissile
has been assigned fails to destroy its
target,
vt = value of the ith target,
E = lathal radics of a weapon,
E(X) = expected value of guartity X,
£x] = greatest integer less than or egual to x, and
Pr(X) = probability of event X occuring.
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Ill- PRE- 1972 JHVESTIGATICJS INTO TEE MISSILE ALLOCATION
PBCBLEH
A. IHTBODUCTICB
la this chapter, an overview of the investigations into
the missile allocation problem from the unclassified litera-
ture prior to the 1972 survey monograph by Eckler and Burr
is gi?en. The order of presentation follows that of this
monograph; however only a summary of the major results of
interest are given, since this is aimed at giving a general
idea of the state of research on the missile allocation
problem up tc 1972 rather than a lengthy exposition of all
these studies. No references to the original publications
are given for the results guoted, since the monograph by
Eckler and Burr provides a comprehensive list of the orig-
inal papers in its bibliography.
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of
the state of research into the missile allocation problem up
to 1972, so that the results of subsequent analyses
presented in chapter 4 could be better appreciated and the
development cf certain key ideas and applications could be
more easily traced. The key results are organized in the
following manner:
• defense strategies for a single point target,
• offense and defense strategies for a group of identical
point targets,
• offense and defense strategies for a group of non-
identical targets with different values, and
• offense and defense strategies in special situations.
Each of these classes cf problems will be addressed in
the following sections.
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B. DBFENSE STRATEGIES FOE A SIHGLE PCIHT TARGET
In this section, the defense of a single point target or
a single area target with uniform value against a single
salvo of weakens or sequential waves of weapons are consid-
ered. The MOE in the case of a single target is
Pr(the target survives) , and in the case of an area target
is E (number cf penetrators)
.
The standard defense problem assumes that the damage
function is a •cookie-cutter' function in the case of a
point target, i.e. a weapon destroys the target if and only
if it lands within a distance R of the target, R being its
lethal radius. It is also assumed that individual missiles
and weapons cperate independently of each other.
If the defense knows the lethal radius and also that a
weapons out of a salvo cf A weapons will land within
distance R before making his allocation, the optimal defense
strategy is to salvo his D nissiles as uniformly as possible
against each of the a weapons, and the probability of target
destruction is
p* = i-n-(i-?) k }*" rn-n-?) k+, }r
where k = [D/A] and r is the remainder when D is divided
by a, i.e. D = ka r . 5 can be approximated by permit-
ting non-integer allocations of missiles to each weapon:
P « 1 - [1-<1-j>)*}* -
The approximation will, in all cases, be at most as large
as the actual value.
The unconditional probability of target destruction is
2{ o.)p (1-p) P* ,
where p = Pr (a weapon lands within distance' R of the
target) .
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Various modifications tc this standard defense problem
can be considered viz.
• defense does not know lethal radius R in a salvo
attack,
• defense does not know attack size A in a sequential
attack,
• defense does not knew lethal radius R in a sequential
attack,
• defense knews that the sequential attack contains one
weapon nixed with decoys, and
• defense can do damage assessment on attacking weapons.
The following subsections describe each of these five
cases in turn.
"*• Defense Strategies when Lethal Radius is Unknow n
It is assumed that the defense knows the attack size
a and the impact points r t of each of these a weapons prior
to allocation of his missiles. However the lethal radius R
of the weapons is not known. An appropriate MOE to use is tc
maximize E (distance of the target to the impact point of the
nearest penetrator) = E.
The probability that the ith closest weapon will penetrate
is
where Bj, = no. cf missiles allocated to the ith weapon.
H j
Then E = r, A, +ra Ax (1-A, ) . . .*rj A; TT ( 1-A-, ) +ri„7T(1-A L ) ,
if the nearest j weapons are assigned missiles. To find the
optimum allocations in* , dynamic programming could be used
to maximize E such that
j
where i = T m; .
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An approximate solution can te derived by allowing
the unknowns to be continuous, and differentiating E with
respect to a;
. in this case a set of recursive eguations is
obtained;
Pk = Fk*. d-A*,) ,
Q k = Q k+I (1-A*+| )+r^ -rK ,
A
R
* = *k/Qk for k = j-2 r j-3 #...,1 ,
where E, = r^, -rj
, Q, = rj+i -rj_, , A* = P, /Q, .






* = log A.*/log (1-f) .
2. Strategies for a Sequential Attack of Unknown Size
It is assumed here that the weapons arrive one at a
time and the defense knows the lethal radius B of the weapon
but not the size of the attack. The objective of the defense
is tc laximize E (number of weapons to the 1st penetrator)
.
This problem is very nearly identical to that of the
preceding subsection, and one can similiarly derive an
approximate solution by neans of a set of recursive
formulae. A very nearly optimal defense strategy can be
stated simply as follows:
For a stockpile of D missiles, allocate approximately D/h
of them tc the 1st h weapons, and none to the (h + 1)th
weapon.
Numerical calculations indicate that the choice of h for
this near optimal defense strategy is about 90X of the first
unengaged weapon under the optimal allocation. The loss in
the expected number to the 1st penetrator is only about 6*
compared with the continuous optimum.
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An exact procedure which provides integer alloca-
tions can be derived directly if it is assumed that D is not
too large, or that no more than 2 missiles may be assigned
to each weapon. By comparing the MOE if 1 missile is
assigned to each of the first (m+1) weapons to the MOE if 2
missiles are allocated to the first weapon and 1 missile tc
each of the next (n-1) weapcns, the following defense allo-
cation strategy is derived; let
m„ = {-log(1-?-p*p$)}/(log g, ) 2
where p = weapon kill probability, and
g, = i-p(1-5>) -
Then if D < m , assign 1 missile each to the first
D weapons, and if D > m , assign 2 missiles each to the
first (D-m. *1)/2 weapons and 1 missile each to the next
(D+m. -1)/2 weapons.
Using the same methodology, one could also derive a
procedure to ottain the optimal defense allocation strategy
given that no more than 3 missiles may be assigned to each
weapon. However, no soluticn has been given which permits
more than 3 missiles to be assigned to a weapon; it is then
neccessary to resort to dynamic programming to obtain a
solution.
An alternative defense strategy can be obtained if,
instead of niaxinizing E(numter of weapons to the 1st pene-
trator), the defense chooses to make Pr (target destruction)
proportional to the attack size up to the point of missile
exhaustion. In this case, the marginal increase in the
target destruction probability achieved by allocating 1 more
weapon to the target is constant. This doctrine of •constant
value decrement' yields the following near optimum alloca-
tion strategy:
m L = -log { (1-i+n)p}/log (1-J) , i = 1,...,n ,
30
¥here m; is the number of missiles assigned to the ith
weapon, and n is the number cf weapons needed to exhaust the
missile stockpile.
If the defense knows the probability distribution of
the attack size, and its objective is to minimize E =
E(numt€r of cenetrators) , tten
where p L = Pr (offense will attack with i or more weapons
inside the lethal radius). pt may be assumed to be either
binomial or gecmetric. The reduction in E resulting from
adding the jth aissile to the ith weapon is
R(irj) = F; {(1-^r' -OS)'* } -
To ottain the optimum allocation, the missiles are assigned
one at a time tc that weapon which gives the greatest value
of R (i,j).
3. Strategies against a Sequential Attack of Unknown
i^thal Eadius
It is assumed here that the attack occurs in waves
of one weapon at a time. The defense does not know the
lethal radius of the weapons, but knows the attack size and
can predict the impact point of each weapon relative to the
target. Twc simplifying extreme cases can be considered,
according to whether the defense has no knowledge or
complete knowledge of the impact point distribution. Two
MOE's are possible:
• lICE 1: max. Pr(the offensive weapon landing nearest the
target is assigned a missile) , or
• HCE 2: max E (total sccre of weapons destroyed), where
score cf a weapon is the probability that a random
weapon will land further from the target than it did.
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In the case where the impact point distribution is
unknown, and MOE 1 is used, the optimum defense strategy is
as follows:
observe the smallest miss-distance in a frac-
tion o(i, i - 1,...,D of the attack, and assign a missile to
the 1st weapcD appearing with a smaller miss-distance.
This observation is done E times, where D is the total
number of missiles available. The optimum fractions rf; have
teen computed and are tabulated. An alternative near optimum
strategy for large attack si2es which is simpler to compute
is as follows:
observe the smallest miss-distance in a fraction
<x = exp{-(E!)* } of the attack and assign m missiles to
the 1st m weapons whose miss-distances are smaller.
If the impact point distribution is known, a near
optimal defense strategy fci large attack sizes A can be
given as follows:
observe the miss-distance r of the ith weapon and assign
a missile tc it if r-
t
< r*, where r* = k/A = Jp (r) dr.
Optimum values of k for different values of D have been
determined.
In the case where the impact point distribution is
known and MOE 2 is used, the optimum defense strategy has
the following fcrm.
Suppose there are t < D missiles remaining, and
k < A weapons yet appear in the attack. When the first of
the k weapons appears with miss-distance r, allocate a
missile if r < r(k,t), where r(k,t) is defined implicitly
by:
r(K.t)
0<k,t) = J p(r)dr
If E(k,t) is the average value of the t probabilities that a
random weapcn exceeds the observed miss-distances of the
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weapons destroyed by the final t missiles,
E (total score of the t weapons) is given by the iterative
equation:
tE(k,t) = [1+0(k,t)} {0.5(1+0 (k,t))+(t-1) E(k-1,t- 1)}
(k,t) tE(k-i,t) .
This yields:
0*(k,t) + (t-1)E*(k-1 rt-1)= tE*(k-1,t) ,
and the optimum values E*(k,t) and 0*(k,t) can be found
recursively using the initial conditions U*(k,k) = 0,
E*(k,ic) = 0.5 , 1 < k < n.
•*• Strategies against a S equential Attack of One Weapon
with Decoys
The assumptions made are the defense knows that the
sequential attack of size A contains one weapon mixed with
(A- 1) decoys, and the missile reliability $ < 1 while the
weapon kill prctability p = 1. In this situation, an appro-
priate MOE for the defense would be to minimize the prob-
ability that a weapon is net intercepted. The weapon is
characterized by a single observation (real number) drawn
from a probability distribution with pdf fw (x), and the
decoy is also characterized by an observation drawn from a
pdf fj (x) , bcth of which are known to the defense.
The optimum strategy can be specified as follows:
Suppose there are t < D nissiles remaining, and k < A
attacking objects yet to appear. When the first of the
objects appear, note the -value c of its observation, and
allocate i missiles to it if c;, < c < c^,
Optimal values of c t , i = 1,...,t*1 can be derived from the
analytical expression of Er (the weapon penetrates) = p,
which is a complicated function of the c; values. Tabulated
values of p associated with optimum c t values are available
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for fw (x) and fj (x) being Normal distributions with unit
variance.
A more general model with more than one weapon among
the A attacking objects has been postulated. The optimal
strategies for two different criteria of effectiveness viz.
min . ?r(1 or more weapons penetrate) and min. E (number of
weapons penetrating) have been determined, for f w (x) being a
Normal density function with unit mean and variance and
fj(x) being a Normal density function with zero mean and
unit variance.
5- Defense Strategies with Damage Assessme nt
When the defense is able to perform damage assess-
ment on the attacking weapons, he can use a k-stage shoot-
look-strategy, whereby m, missiles are allocated to A weapons
in the first stage, then mx missiles are allocated tc
A-n t surviving weapons in the second stage after observing
which n, weapons have been destroyed in the first stage, and
so on, and finally D- (m, mi +.. -+m K_, ) missiles are allocated
to the A- (n, +nj, + . . .-«-n K., ) surviving weapons. The MOE used in
this case is max. Pr (no weapons survive).
An algorithm for determining the optimal shoot-look-
shoot strategy for any number of stages can be devised by
using a set cf recursive eguations, whereby the optimum




For a 2-stage shoot-look-shoot strategy with A = 2,
the optimal allocation is D/2 missiles to the 1st stage and
D/2 missiles to the 2nd stage; in both cases, the missiles
are assigned uniformly to all weapons. When A = 3 or more,
analytical results are difficult to obtain, and a computer
must be used to obtain the optimum allocation for each A and
D.
3U
For a D-stage shoot-look-shoot strategy, a missile
is assigned at each stage, and in this situation,
Pr(no weapons survive) is
p =!(?)IH)H ? : .
i. * A
for high values of £ , providing a single 'look 1 in a
2-stage shoct-look-shoot strategy is quite worthwhile in
terms cf the gain in Pr (no weapons survive) over a 1-stage
strategy (no damage assessment) , but providing more than one
look is much less so unless the missile reliability is
low
.
A special consideration for k-stage shoot-look-shoot
strategies is when a single missile is allocated to each
weapon and time is limited. This gives rise to what is
known as a fire-power limited shoot-look-shoot defense. If
T is the time interval between the 1st possible assignment
of a uissile to a weapon and the destruction of the target
by that weapon, and X is the time reguired for a missile to
attack the weapon and evaluate the outcome, then a k-stage
shoot- lcok-shoot strategy can be used against each weapon,
where k = [T/t]. It is assuued that the offense attacks with
A weapons arriving at equally spaced intervals of length sT.
Four cases can he considered depending on the value of s.
When s > k, the successive weapon engagements are
independent cf each other, and the probability that a weapon
will destroy the target is
P = 1-{1- (1-? ) k } A .
When s < k, successive weapon engagements are not
independent of each other and delays in engagements of
successive weapons can occur. The evaluation of P is
consequently much more involved, and it becomes neccessary
to use a computer to evaluate P.
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When s = 1, the time interval between successive
weapon arrivals is equal to the time required to engage a
weapon with a nissile, and P can be given by the cumulative
negative bincmial distribution





In the previous analyses, it was assumed that the
arrival times of weapons are equally spaced. In an attempt
to te more realistic, it is sometimes assumed that the
arrival times consist of order statistics obtained from a
Normal or an Exponential distribution. In these cases, it
may occur that certain weapons cannot be engaged at the time
of their arrival because the defense is still occupied with
earlier weapons, if the arrival time of a weapon is less
than the time I required for a missile to engege a weapon.
The probability of no delay of the weapons can be given, in
the case where A = 2, f = 1 , and the arrival time distribu-
tion is a Normal distribution with standard deviation , as
For values of A greater than 2, it is necessary to
resort to Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the values of the
maximum delay times.
If the weapon arrival times are assumed to be expo-
nential with parameter a, the probability of no delay can be




A mere general result assumes that T is not
constant, but a random variable from a Gamma distribution
with parameters n,7\.. In this case, the probability of no
delay is
/I (1 - ia/A )
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C. S1BATEGIIS FOB A GEOOP C* IDENTICAL TARGETS
In the previous sections, optimum defense strategies
were presented in the case cf a single point target. In
contrast this section considers offense and defense strat-
egies for a grcup of independent identical point targets
with identical values under different degrees of knowledge
each side has of the other's stockpile size and allocations
to individual targets.
The offense and defense strategies that are considered
here are organized in the following manner:
• preallocation strategies- offense-last-move
- defense-last-move
- neither side knows the
other's allocation
• ncn-preallocation strategies- varying attack size
- fixed attack size
• lixed ncn-preallocation and preallocation strategies
• damage assessment strategies- defense damage assessment
- offense damage assessment
• attacker-oriented strategies- neither side knows the
other's allocation
- offense knows defense
allocation
Each of these topics will be dealt with in the following
subsections.
1. Pre allocation strategies
Strategies allocating weapons and missiles to indi-
vidual targets rather than to subgroups of targets are
called preallocation strategies, and are based on the
assumption that attack evaluation by the defense is
possible. Two advantages cf preallocation strategies are
that they represent effectively computable exact solutions
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of fairly realistic problems, and that they are more effec-
tive fox the defense than ether strategies if the offense
outnumbers the defense and missile reliability is not very
high.
It is generally assumed here that missile engage-
ments are oce-on-one, and that both sides know the other's
stockpile size and weapon kill probability p and missile
reliability f . The MOE is Effraction of targets saved), and
can be given by
E (f ) = H;
,
l»l
where F; is Pr (the ith target survives), and T is the total
number of targets.
a. Cf fense-Last-Move
The offense- last-move situation represents a
lower bound for Effraction of targets saved), since it
implies that the offense can see the entire defense alloca-
tion of missiles to individual targets before making his own
allocation. In this case, the best possible defense
strategy is tc allocate an equal number of missiles to each
target.
The optimum offense strategy against this
defense can be derived as fellows: Let the offense attack a
fraction of the targets yk = a/k with k weapons per target,
k > a. If I (k) is the probability that the target is
destroyed if attacked by k weapons and defended by d
missiles, then Effraction of targets saved) E (f ) = 1-yK P (k)
Assuming that P (k) is a function for which a unigue value of
k, denoted k* naximizes F(k)/k (the average return per
weapon at an attacked target), the offense allocation that
maximizes P(k)/k also minimizes E(f) if k* > a. Hence
E (f ) = 1 - {aP(k*)}/k* if < a < k*, and
E(f) = 1 - E (a) if k* < a .
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For the one-on-cue defense that is assumed,
r» rvi - _«»»V»(J, k) m*x (o, k-<0
b. Eefense-Last-Move
The defense- last-move situation represents an
upper bound for the expected fraction of targets saved,
since it implies that the defense can see the entire offense
allocation of weapons to targets before making his own allo-
cation cf missiles. The best possible offense strategy in
this case is to allocate an equal number of weapons to each
target. For the defense, if d > a, the maximizing defense
strategy is to attack each weapon with a single missile
(since engagements are assumed to be one-on-one only) . If
d < a, the optimal defense strategy is assign 1 missile each
to a fracticn d/a of the targets, and no missiles to the
rest. Ihe corresponding value of E(f) is
E (f ) = (a-a)gj7a dg,Va .
c. Neither Side Knci«s the Other's Allocation
In the situation where neither side knows the
other's allocation to targets, the problem can be formulated
in terms of a two-person-zero-sum game, with the payoff
being the fraction of targets saved. A generalization of the
fundaaental theorem of games states that there exists
optimum pdf's cf offense and defense strategies, and the
game has a value V given ty max min E (f ) , where x and 2
represent the different defense and offense levels respec-
tively. The sclution to the allocation problem consists of
finding these vectors x = (x # x, ,x 2> ,-..) and
Y = (Yo »Yi ry*#»«0 such that a fraction x, of the targets are
selected at random for no defense, a fraction x, are
selected for defense by 1 missile, etc., and similiarly for
the vector y. Then E(fracticE of targets saved) is
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,xi y. g, g.
This problem can be expressed as a constrained game which
are usually solved by linear programming. However, Matheson
[Bef. 3] has found a solution to the preallocation problem
without using linear programing explicitly. The results of
Mathescn's wcrk are rather difficult to describe concisely;
the reader is urged to refer to the original paper for
details. The problem can be simplified by setting
P = ? - 1 (perfect weapons and missiles) . In this situation,
the optimum offense and defense strategies can be given in
terms of a ard d in each of two cases:
• defense dcninant, i.e. [2d+1] > £2a]. In this case, the
defense strategy is
Xi = 2([2d + 1 ]-d)/[2d+2][2d-H] for i = 0,1,...,[2d] ,
and x [ii+lJ = (2d-£2d])/£2d+2] ,
and the offense strategy is
y^ = 2a/£2d+1 ]£2d+2] for i = 1,2, ,[2d+1] , and
y = 1 - 2a/£2d+2] .
• offense dcninant, i.e. [2d+1] < [a]. In this case, the
defense strategy is
&l = 2d/[ 2a]£2a-1] for i = 1, 2,. .. r £ 2a-1 ] ,
xc = 1 - 2d/£2a] ,
and the offense strategy is
y ; = 2(£2a]-a)/[2a]£2a-1] for i = 1,...,£2a-1] ,
hu} = (2a-[2a])/£2a] .
In order to get integer allocations which may
not be possible using the previous analyses, an integer
strategy game analogous to the Matheson game can be defined.
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whereby the nixed strategy used is a probability distribu-
tion function (P, #Pi # • .- #P W ) taken over N different pure
strategies (the actual allocations of an integer number of
missiles or weapons to each of the T targets). This integer
allocation gaie is impossible to solve in closed form except
for vary small numbers of weapons, missiles, and targets,
because the nunber of pure strategies becomes very large
guickly. For g^= 0, and g, = 1 however, the value of the
Mathescn game is the same as that of the integer strategy
game. If D (cr A) and T are not too large, it is possible to
find the optimum strategies by using linear programming,
which can also be used to sclve various generalizations to
the Matheson game such as:
• upper limits on the nunber of missiles or weapons that
can be allocated to a target,
• allocation doctrines besides one-on-one,
• several different types of missiles or weapons,
• independent defense regions, and
• generalized shoot-look-shoot strategies.
Ihe variance in the total number of targets
saved if both sides use pure strategies can be given by the
upper hound Var(Z) < T* V (1-v) / (T- 1) , which shows that the
variance bound depends only en Effraction of targets saved),
and not on the missile and weapon allocations.
It can also be argued that if both offense and
defense use pure strategies , then as T—* <*> , the distribution
of the number of targets saved converges to a Normal distri-
bution with mean and variance less than 1. This limiting
Normal distribution can be used to make estimates of the
probabilities that the number of surviving targets is less
than, cr greater than, a specified value.
Another model for the preallocation offense and
defense when neither side knows the other's allocation is
known frequently as a 'Blotto game', whereby the defense has
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a single real target mixed *ith (T-1) dummy targets, and the
offense, not knowing which is the real target, allocates
weapons among the targets- The Blotto game can be formulated
either as a discrete game or as a continuous game. When
o = p = 1, and a > d (offense dominant) , the optimum offense
strategy is to attack a typical target with a L weapons,
where a;, is a random variable drawn from a Uniform distribu-
tion (0, 2a) ; the optimum defense strategy is to defend a
typical target with probability d/a, using di missiles,
where d;, is distributed according to the same Uniform
distribution.
If a < d (defense dominant) , the optimum offense
strategy is to attack a typical target with probability a/d
using a;, weapons, where a;, is a random drawing from a
Uniform distribution U(0 # 2d), and the corresponding optimum
defense strategy is to defend a typical target with
di missiles, where d;, is drawn from the same probability
distribution.
The general form of the optimum offense and
defense strategies for a continuous Blotto game with one-on-
one engagemerts was derived assuming that the probability
that a target survives when attacked by y weapons and
defended by x lissiles is of the form
2 (x,y) = s(y) , < y < x
= s (x) t (y-x) , x < y ,
where s (x) and t (y) are convex functions with continuous
derivatives, and s(0) = t(C) = 1. If f (y) dy and g(x)dx are
the fractions cf targets attacked by y weapons and defended
by x aissiles respectively, the optimum defense strategy is
given by g(x) satisfying the equation:
.••
J g(x)P(x,y)dx = m-h (y) in some interval U < y < V, and
Ji*g (x)P (x,y) dx > m-h(y) outside this interval.
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The quantities tt,h,U,V are determined so that
m-ha is maximized. The corresponding offense strategy is
given ty f(y) satisfying the equation:
17 f (y)P(x,y)dy = n+kx in some interval < x < V and
J
o
f (y) E (x,y)dy < n+kx outside this interval.
Again, the quantities n # k,U,'V are determined so that n+kd is
minimized.
2. Non- pre allocation Strategies
Alien the defense is rot able to perform attack eval-
uation for each target, a group preferential strategy would
need to be adopted by the defense instead of a preallocation
strategy. In this case, the defense allocates all of its
missiles to defend only a subgroup of the targets. In this
subsection, group preferential strategies are considered in
two situations:
• varying attack size
• fixed attack size
When the attack size is varying, one possible
defense strategy is to defend a random subset d/k of the
targets with the entire stockpile, where k is an integer
value. Fhen any target within the subset is attacked, a
missile is allocated to it. It is assumed that the offense
knows the value of the fraction d/k, but not the actual
defended subset, and attacks the targets in waves of one
weapon against each target with a total of i waves, where i
is a random variable from a probability distribution with a
mean of a. In this situation, the optimum offense strategy
is a strategy containing a lower and upper attack level
denoted by i and (a+j) respectively.
If k = a, the defense stockpile will be equal to the
expected attack size on the defended subset. As d—+a, the
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advantages of randomization are lost. If d > a, the best
defense would be to engage each weapon, abondoning the group
preferential strategy.
If the value of k is not known to the offense, he
could tailor his attack such that E (fraction of targets
saved) is the same no matter what value k is selected,
d < k < t, by selecting the Matheson strategy corresponding
tod=h, t=m.
When the attack size is fixed, two extreme cases can
be considered:
• weapons arrive at randcn, and
• weapons arrive in an order controlled by the offense.
Each side knows the other 1 s stockpile but not the
specific allocation of weapons to targets, or which subset
of targets have been selected for defense. It is assumed
that p = f = 1 . when the weapon arrival order is controlled,
the decision to use a group preferential or a preallocation
strategy depends on what the defense thinks the offense
knows about his plans. If the weapon arrivals are random, it
is likely tc be profitable for the defense to shift from a
preallocation to a group preferential strategy.
3- Mixed Preallocation and Non-preallocation Strategies
A mixture of preallocation and non-preallocation
strategies can be selected ty the defense as follows. The
target set is divided randomly into disjoint groups of
various sizes, and a fraction of the total stockpile of
missiles is allocated to each group for defense. It appears
guite difficult to determine the optical offense and defense
strategies as a function of A,D, and 1 if D < A and T < A.
For defense-last-mcve, the determination of an
optimal offense strategy is equivalent to solving a set of
nonlinear equations, and becomes computationally formidable
as the complexity of the problem increases. If neither side
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knows the other's strategy before choosing his allocation,
the problem becomes a gane-theoretic one. The expected
number of targets saved will lie between the of fense- last-
move and defense-last-move values, and both sides must use
mixtures of strategies. Ir general, these game- theoretic
probleas are even more difficult to solve. One can use a
linear program to determine approximate optimum non-
preallccation defense strategies when both p and are less
than 1. However, since the expected fraction of targets
saved is not linear in the offensive allocations y; , where
y; is the fraction of targets attacked by i weapons, an
exact linear programming solution to the allocation problem
must consider as many linear constraints as there are pure
offense strategies (since a mixed offense strategy is a
linear combination of pure offense strategies), which is a
very large number.
4. Damage a s sessment Strategies
Damage assessment by the defense enables him to
increase the expected fraction of targets saved by evalu-
ating target damage during the course of the engagement and
subseguently defending only undestroyed targets. On the
other hand, the offense can also damage assessment by
attaching in waves and obtaining information about the
effectiveness of earlier waves before deciding on the
targets for the next wave. The potential gains in using
damage assessment strategies are analysed in the following
two subsections.
a. Defense Damage Assessment
A general defense-last-mcve damage assessment
model can be developed assuming that the parameters A,D,T,p
and are known to both sides, and that the defense knows
that the offense will attack in waves of one weapon per
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target in each wave. To simplify the analysis, it is further
assumed that the number of targets surviving after each wave
is given deterninistically by its expected value.
lihen p < 1 , the optimal defense has the
following fcrm, with wave a arriving first, and wave 1
arriving last:
wave a thrcugh n+1: defend no targets,
wave n: defend a fraction cf the surviving targets, and
wave n-1 through 1: defend all surviving targets.
Shen p = 1 (perfect weapons) , this strategy must
be modified so that a fraction of the targets is defended
starting at wave a. The value n is equal to the smallest
value cf i fcr which Q't > d where
J- (y + 0- y)fr }" *-= - *v - y jtjl v * *r ' L * a, a- 1 I .
The expected number of missiles to allocate to targets on
the ith wave d^* can be given by a set of recursive equa-
tions, and I (f) is given by
E(f) = {d*/T} lq o + (1-q, ) q, ) .
Ihe maximum value of D required if all targets are defended
at all waves is
D
Comparisons of the expected fraction of targets
saved in the case of preallocation strategy and damage
assessment strategy show that there is not much improvement
made by damage assessment. Thus these strategies gain little
for the defense in the case cf defense-last-move.
b. Cffense Damage Assessment
Cffense damage assessment strategies have been
considered in the cases where both missiles and weapons are
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perfect, only the defensive missiles are perfect, and only
the attacking weapons are perfect.
In the case of perfectly reliable missiles and
weapons, the defense can maximize E (fraction of targets
saved) in a k-wave attack by observing the number a;, of
weapons per surviving target allocated by the offense at the
ith attack wave, and then selecting di , the corresponding
number of missiles allocated per surviving target at the ith
wave such that a v /di, = a/d. In this case,
E(f) = (d/a)k .
A better strategy for the defense would be to select
d = 11/k missiles to be used in each wave. The fraction cf
targets saved using this strategy is greater than E (f ) with
equality occuring when aT/k weapons are allocated to each
wave.
In the case where weapon kill probability is
less than 1, the problem becomes more complex. To simplify
the analysis, it is assumed that the offense does not reat-
tack a target if a weapon assigned to that target was not
intercepted by the defense, even though the target may
survive. Then
E(f) =1 - 2 u n-tdi/ainn-n-p)* }
i-l
where f : = TT d -t /a; .
The optimal strategies satisfying max mjn E (f ) appears
unsolvatle in closed form. An upper bound can however be
easily obtained if an infinite number of waves is assumed,
let the 1st wave attack be a, = a-d weapons per target. In
subsequent waves, if the defense allocates d; missiles per
target in the ith wave, the attacker allocates a^, = di
weapons per target in the (i+1)th wave. The expected frac-
tion of targets killed is 1-(1-p) 4 ~ d -
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A somewhat different offensive damage assessment
problem can be considered assuming that the defense does not
know the weapon stockpile si2e A. The offense is assumed to
allocate one weapon at a time to a target, and continue
firing at undestroyed targets until all T targets are
destroyed. In this situation, an appropriate MOE for the
defense would be to maximize E (number of weapons required
to destroy I targets) . The optimum missile allocation can
then be found by dynamic programming using the recursion:
f(i,j) = max {Hf (i,j-m) (1-e <1-f)* ) *f (i-1, j-m) p (1-ff } ,
where f(i,j) = E (number cf weapons required to destroy
i targets given j missiles are availatle)
.
5. Attacker-Oriented Defense Str ategies
The preceding secticr considered the gain in effec-
tiveness if the defense could assess damage to its targets.
In contrast, there may arise a situation where the defense
is not able to predict which target a weapon is aimed at
before allocating a missile to engage it. The best that the
defense can do in such a situation would be to use an
attacker-oriented strategy and assign missiles at random to
the weapons en a one-to-cne basis, and knowing this
strategy, the offense would attack each target with
a weapons.
If d > a, every weapon will he allocated 1 missile.
If d < a, the number of weapons which are actually inter-
cepted would be a random variable from a binomial distribu-
tion with parameter d/a.
Two distinct cases can be considered for attacker-
oriented defense: when neither side knows the other's
allocation, and when the attacker knows the defender's allo-
cation. In both cases, it is assumed that both sides know
the value of A,E,T,P, and p.
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When both sides must make their allocations in igno-
rance of the other's allocation, the optimal strategies for
both are to allocate missiles and weapons randomly and as
unifonly as possible. In the case where the attacker has
the last move, the optimal defense strategy is to allocate
missiles as uniformly as possible to the targets. If D/A is
an integer and the defense uses his optimal strategy, the
optimal offense strategy would be to assign [A/T] weapons to
T-(A-I[A/T]) targets and [A/T]+1 weapons to A-T[ A/T ]
targets,
D. SIBATEGIIS JOB A GROUP C* HOH-IDEMTICAL TABGETS
In this section, offense and defense strategies for a
group of targets with unequal values v*
u
are considered. The
value of a target may be related to some physical parameter
of the target such as the human population for a city
target. It is assumed that the target values and stockpile
sizes are known to both offense and defense. An appropriate
aOE in this case would be the expected value of targets
saved, E(V), Since the targets have different values, it is
reasonable tc assume that they would have different vulner-
abilities; hence the value of p, the weapon kill prob-
ability, will not be constant, but will vary with the target
with which it is associated. In general, the approaches that
have been developed to find optimum offense and defense
strategies fcr targets of unequal values lead to approximate
solutions rather than exact ones. The following situations
have been analyzed by researchers;
• one-sided allocation problems,
• offense-last-move strategies,
• strategies when neither side kncws the other's alloca-
tion,
• strategies when offense stockpile size is unknown, and
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• attacker-oriented defense strategies-
Each of these situations are presented in the following
subsections.
1. One-Sided Allocation Problem
A one-sided allocation problem exists when the allo-
cation strategy of one side has been specified and is known
to the other side who then designs his optimal allocation to
counter that specific enemy strategy- Two mathematical tech-
niques available for this type of problem are dynamic
programming and Lagrange Multipliers- To utilize these
methods for finding the maximum value of E (7) and the
optimal defense allocation for a specified offense alloca-
tion, the prcblem can be formulated as
K T
max £E(i,di) subject tc Z c K &i < C ,
where E(i,d t ) is a general function denoting the expected
value saved at the ith target if d; missiles each of cost c;
are allocated to it, and C is the total available defense
budget for missiles.
The dynamic programming approach solves successive
maximization problems using a recursion equation, whereas
the Lagrange Multiplier method firds the unconstrained
maximum of the lagrangian function either by direct differ-
entiation of the Lagrangian, or by direct search methods.
2- Strategies with Off ense-Last-Move
Various methods for determining offense and defense
strategies when the offense has the last move have been
proposed. The approaches to this problem can be divided into
two categories. The first category uses an arbitrary payoff
function E(i,a;,dt), while the other category assumes
specific payoff functions. In general, specialized payoff
functions simplify the analysis considerably.
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Using the Lagrange Multiplier approach, approximate
upper and lower bounds for E*(V) can re obtained, if optimal
strategies are used by both sides, by introducing the
Lagraagian function:
T T T
L(;t,v) = max min { 2 E (i, a; ,d; ) - A£.d't *w 2 a; } .
A lower bound to E* (V) is given by
E{i,a.f,d*) - 71. a* «.?-af ,
where ( ?i. , w„ ,
a
l
* / d.*) is the maximum solution to the
lagraagian. An upper bound to E* (V) can be obtained by
finding maxiium solutions to the Lagrangian for other values
of A and w, e.g. a, , w, with corresponding values a^d^A'
and D». Then if E {i, a'
,d.J ) - A.fA-A* ) +w, (D-D 1 ) < Z E (i,a* ,d*) ,
a range of A , At < A<7\( can be eliminated, where a,' i n the
above equation changes the inequality. Using this elimina-
tion procedure successively for different Lagrangian solu-
tions, only a small region of in the vicinity of 7\ will not
be eliminated, e.g. ?!i_ < ^o <7\h- An upper bound for E* (V) is
then the maximum value of L (7\,w) in the region A u < 7\ < 7\ H t
a = w . If the difference between these bounds is small,
the use of the Lagrangian strategies a* and d.* is practi-
cable.
Another approach to the same problem is by using the
dynamic programming relation
c- (A,E) = nax min {E (i,a L ,d^ ) *c;-, (A-a L , D-d;, ) } ,
starting with i = 1 and solving iteratively for a.*, &* ,
i = 1,...,T. The final c T (A,D) will however only be an
upper bound to E* (V) , and the allocation found will be non-
optimal. A lower bound can be found by adopting the weapon
allocation a..*, and using dynamic programming to determine
the corresponding defensive allocations.
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Three explicit payoff functions with increasing
degrees of simplicity are considered.
In an idealized defense in which each weapon is
intercepted by d /a missiles, the payoff function E(i) can
be given by
E(i) = V;, {1-<u exp(-t:di/a t )} ,
where t; = -ln(1-j>;) .
The expected value of targets saved with optimal strategies
is thsn
T
E*(V) = max min £ E (i) .
The problem cf finding the optimal strategies a
;
* and d.* is a
very difficult analytical problem. An approximation to the
optimal strategies can be derived in the case when the total
attack size is very large compared with the defense stock-
pile and the number of targets. Then
a* = {In c - In (-vi In m)}/ln u; ,
where u ; = 1 - gol exp(-t;.D/A) ,
In c = {A £ In (-vi In u,,)/ln u u } / £ 1/ln a-. ,
1*1 i*»
dt* = Ea.*/A and E* (V) = £ v k u? .
A valid solution is obtained when any negative a.* are elimi-
nated (target i left undefended) , the closed form solution
derived for the remaining targets, and the positive a*
satisfy the ineguality
m
aj*ln uL * ur*
;
< 1 t t di (1-Ui)/u ; -
If the iiissiles are assumed to be reliable, i.e. $ =
1, the payoff function is given by




and E*(V) = nax min (E (i) - A d; + wa
t ) .
The optimizing values of d; and a; can be found for any A
and w in three cases:
A < w: then d;* = (v—t^J/M for v < V; x, and
a* = or v
t
/w - 1/x at will,
where x = -In (1-p) and t; = {w/x} {1 - In (w/v
;
x) } ;
A = w: then d.* = any value in the range {0, (v
;
-t^ ) /w} for
w < - x ,
a* = or v t /w - 1/x if df = (V;-t;)/w and
a.* = d* - ln(w/v- x)/x if d.* < (v;-t
c
)/w ;
h> w: then d
L
* = and a* = max {0, - (In (w/v
c
x) ) /x} ;
T
Tt and w are selected by trial and error so that "EI a* = A.
and I d.* = D. In the first two cases. d 5* = a* =0 if
W > V£ X .
In the case where p = P « 1 (perfect missiles and
wea pons)
,
E (i) = v; if a-
t
< d; , and if a; > d; .
One treatment of this problem assumes a weapon
stockpile size normalized to 1 and a missile stockpile size
of H = D/A. Using techniques from the theory of linear equa-
tions and number theory, it can be shown that there exists
certain canonical defense strategies corresponding to
defense stockpiles H r • •
•
# H^ , such that the defense can
achieve the sane E* (V) by using only H; missiles, where
Hi < 3 < Hj+ , , i.e. one lists the complete set of offense and
defense strategies for 1 < D/A < T, and the optimal offense/
defense strategies are those that maximizes/ minimizes the
expected value destroyed. This method is however only
feasible for small numbers of targets, as the combinatorial
possibilities go up rapidly with increases in the number of
targets.
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3. Str ategies when Neither Side Knows the Other 's
Allocatio n
The game-theoretic situation where each side knows
the other's stockpile size tut not his allocation to targets
is a very difficult problem mathematically. In order to
obtain optimum strategies, it is necessary to make a number
of simplifying assumptions to make the problem more trac-
table analytically.
If it is assumed that A > D and p = o = 1 with the
payoff function being the expected value of targets
destroyed, the optimal offense strategy is to attack the a
single target with the entire stockpile A, and the defense
allocates its missiles among the more valuable targets,
leaving the less valuable targets undefended.
If there are only two targets with values Vi and
v2 , the optimum defense and offense strategies can be
obtained in 5 cases:
• D = A-1 (neither side dominant): the unique optimal
offense strategy is to allocate all weapons to the more
valuable target, while all defense strategies are
equivalent. The value cf the game V is max (V. ,VA );
• D > 2A (defense overwhelming) : any defense strategy is
optimum as long as at least A missiles are allocated to
each target, while all offense strategies are equiva-
lent with 7=0;
• 2C+2 < A (offense overwhelming) : any offense strategy
is optimal as long as at least D+ 1 weapons are allo-
cated tc each target. The defense strategy has no
effect and V = v, +vx .
In the remaining two cases where 2A-1 > D > A
(defense doninant) and D+2 < A < 2D + 1 (offense dominant) ,
the optimal strategies can te written as a convex linear
combination of extremal strategies cf the general form:
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allocate i missiles (or weapons) to the target of value v
t
and the remaining missiles (cr weapons) to the other target
of value vz with probability x { , where 2 *.* = 1- When
defense is dominant, each extremal optimal defense strategy
corresponds to a sequence M = (m, ,..., m^) of integers such
that 1<m» <mx <.. .<m K <R where k is the smallest
integer > (A + 1) / (D-A+1) , and B = k (D-A+1) -A, and allocates
i(D-A*1)-mi missiles to the target with value v, (and the
remaining missiles to the target with value v2 ) with prob-
ability
(v;"V-l)/(vakH *v. v,k-S...*v(^vi *v,'1") , i = 1,...,k .
Similiarly each extremal optimal offense strategy corre-
sponds to a sequence (ni,n2 ,...) of integers such that
(D-A+ 1) >n, >n».>. ..>R, and allocates i(D-A+1)-n; weapons to
the target of value v, (and the remainder to target va )
with probability
(v,K
-V-')/(*r + v, ¥j"x+... ,*"*,, +¥,,H ) , 1=1, ...,k .
When the offense is dominant, the extremal optimal
defense strategies are obtained by substituting D = A-2 and
A = D into the extremal optimal offense strategy given
above, and th€ eitremal optimal offense strategies are
obtained by substituting D and A into the extremal optimum
defense strategy formula.
**• Strategies for Unkn own Wea pon Stockpile Size
If the defense has no knowledge of the offensive
stockpile size, it is reasonable to design a strategy such
that the expected value of targets destroyed is approxi-
mately proportional to the attack size (robust strategy) . If
the offense has the last move, the objective of the defense
would be to minimize the maximum (over all possible attack
strategies) expected value destroyed per weapon expended at
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the ith target, i.e. min Si where
Si = lax £ (vi -E (i,a; , dj, ) ) /a; ) . This is achieved by
selecting an optimal defense strategy (d,*,. .. ,d/) such that
S; = k at all defended targets and S; < k at all undefended
targets, where k is found by trial and error satisfying
Fd* = D.
When neither side knows the ether's allocation, a
near optimal defense strategy can te constructed if the
missile reliability is assumed to te 1, and an uninter-
rupted weapon damages exactly one unit of target value. If Vj
is an integer and 2. Vi = D, then r 1,.«.,2v;, missilies are
assigned to the defense of a target of value v^ , each with
probability 1/(2vi+1)« If the stockpile size is D = k Z v: ,
the corresponding defense allocation would be scaled up to
be 0, 1, 2,...,2kv; missiles assigned with probabilities
1/(2kVi +1) .
5- Attacker-Oriented Defense Strategies
Attacker-oriented defense strategies are used when
the defense is ignorant of which targets the incoming
weapons are attacking. If the offense has the last move, the
uniform attacker-oriented strategy described earlier for
identical targets is also cptimum in the case of unequal-
valued targets.
If both sides are ignorant cf the other's alloca-
tion, the optimal defense is a uniform random attacker-
oriented strategy similiar to the case where targets are
identical, i.e. allocate [D/A] missiles randomly to
A-D+A[E/A] incoming weapons and £D/A]+1 missiles to the
remainder. The optimal offense strategy can be approximated
to be as follows: allocate weapons to the T„ targets of
greatest value, where T is the maximum value of i satis-
fying the inequality
vt > (TTv- )T
ifQ"^f
, 1 < i < T ,
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and Q =1-p(1-p ) ,
with
p. = (1WA*[D/A]) (1-(1-£) )*(D/A-£D/A]) (1-(1-?) ).
The number of weapons assigned to v- , 1 < j < T is
aj = (log c - log Vj ) /log Q ,
where
* X A-
C = (TT Vj ) QT. .
E- SIBATEGIIS IH SPECIAL SI10ATIOHS
la this section, the problem of allocating offensive
weapons and defensive missiles in three special situations
are presented:
• attacks on the defense system,
• defense using local and area missiles, and
• budget constrained defense using local and area
missiles.
These represent more realistic scenarios than the previ-
ously idealized cases of offense and defense strategies. The
mathematical models are consequently more difficult to solve
analytically, and it is necessary in most cases to resort to
iterative search procedures or Monte Carlo simulations on a
computer in order to find the optimal allocation strategies.
1- A ttacks on th e Defe nse System
It was mentioned earlier that an alternative
feasible strategy for the offense would be to allocate some
of his weapons to attack the defense system itself on the
premise that undefended targets would be more vulnerable
than defended ones. The cffense would normally attack a
critical component of the defense system such that when it
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is destroyed, the entire defense system would be rendered
either inoperative or its operation would be seriously
degraded. Examples of such critical components are radars,
command-and-ccntrol centres cr tactical communication links.
It is assumed that there are B such identical components
e.g. E radars all of which must be destroyed before the
entire defense system is considered destroyed. It is also
assumed that there are T identical point targets, the
defense can carry out attack evaluation, and both sides know
the other's stockpile size.
The HOE is the expected fraction of targets saved,
and can be given generically by
E(f) = pE u (f) + d-p)E d (f) ,
where p is Pr (all radars are destroyed) , E u (f) and Ej (f ) are
the expected fractions of targets saved if undefended acd
defended, respectively.
If the cffense has the last move and if missiles are
completely reliable, but tie radars are completely vulner-
able to attack, i.e. Pr (an undefended radar is destroyed by
a weapon) is 1, then the optimal defense strategy would be
to divide the aissile stockpile into two equal parts, and
allocate each part evenly tc the radars and targets respec-
tively, if the offense allocates his weapons evenly among
the defended targets. In scire circumstances when the attack
is not uniform, a better defense strategy would be to shift
some jissiles from radars to targets, since only one radar
is required for the defense system to be operative.
If the defense has the last move and has a central
stockpile frcm which missiles are drawn either to defend a
radar or a value target, he will defend a randomly selected
radar against attack as lcng as missiles remain in the
stockpile, and then use an attacker-oriented strategy to
assign missiles to incoming weapons starting with the most
lightly attacked targets. The offense will attack all radars
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with the sane number of weapons in order to reduce or
exhaust the defense stockpile. Above a certain number, the
radars will no longer be a soft spot in the defense, and a
tetter offense strategy would be to attack the targets
directly rather than attack the radars. In the defense-last-
move aodel, the defense must make allocation decisions in
the course of the attack, based on up-to-date information.
An alternative defense strategy analogous to the Matheson
strategy could be devised, that do not depend on the capa-
bility to aake 'on-the-spot' decisions. However, this
strategy is inferior to the defense-last-move strategy.
In the case where the defense is restricted to a
one-oa-cne defense for both radars and targets, and the
defense intercepts each attacker as long as there are still
missiles available, the problem of determining the minimum
necessary number of radars so that the offense attacks
targets only can be solved. In a target-only attack, the
expected fraction of targets saved is given by
and in a mixed target-radar attack, the expected fraction of
targets saved is given by
A- *4c A-ftd-
E„ (f ) = kg. t (1-k) {g. +?(1-g. )} t ,
(X ft
where k = Pr (all radars are destroyed) = {1- (gor + f (1-g.r) ) '} ,
a r is the number of weapons allocated to radars, and gor is
Pr(an undefended radar survives an attack by a weapon) . The
minimam neccessary value of R is the smallest R for which
E m {£) > E t (f ) for all ar in the interval (0,A/R)
.
In a model with offensive damage assessment, it is
assumed that the offense knows the defensive stockpile size
but not vice versa, the attack is sequential with i weapon
at a time allocated to either a radar or a target, and the
offense can carry out damage assessment between firings. The
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MOE used is the expected number of weapons required to kill
the T targets. Dynamic programming can be used to obtain the
optimal defense allocation to each incoming weapon, and the
offense allocation to either target or radar in each succes-
sive wave. If the expected number of weapons required tc
destroy i targets given j radars and k missiles and the next
attack is on a target is denoted by ft (i,j,k), and the anal-
ogous expected number of weapons, given the next attack is




x{1 + f {i,j,k-m) ( 1-f (l-p)" ) *t (i-1 , j,k-m) p (1-j>)* } ,
Mi, j,k)=max{1*f <i, j,k-m) (1-Qflrf) 1" )+f (i, j-1,k-a) pr (I-?)*} ,
f(i,j,k) = min {ft (i,j,k) , fr(i/j/k)} , where P f = 1-g r .
If an offense strategy that includes attacks on
missile silcs is considered, the problem becomes more
complex. In order to evaluate this situation, the following
assumptions are made: the offense can attack missile silos,
radars and value targets in waves of one weapon directed at
each of the E missile silos, or at each of the B radars, or
at each of the T targets, and continues with the attacks
until I or fewer targets survive, the value of I being known
to the defense. All engagements are one-on-one given that
p = p = 1, and there is ro offense damage assessment,
although the offense has the last move. The MOE used is the
expected number of weapons required to destroy I or more
targets.
The defense strategy is as fellows: if the offense
attacks the radars, allocate 1 missile to defend a specific
(unknown to the offense) radar; if the offense attacks the
targets, then allocate I missiles to defend a specific
subset (unknown to the offense) containing I targets; and if
the missile silcs are attacked, allocate half of the unused
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and undamaged missile stockpile to defend the silos of the
other half of the stockpile. If R and T/I are both integer
powers of 2, the number of weapons required to ensure I or
more targets are destroyed is
A = 1-IR+D <1+log^R) for R < T/I
= DH + log! (1/1)} for E > T/I .
The offense strategy is as follows; if R < T/I,
attack missile silos in log^ waves of D weapons each, then
attack radars in {D/E - 1) waves of R weapons each, and
finally attack (T-I) targets in a single wave of T weapons.
If R > T/I, attack missile silos in log z (T/I) waves of
D weapons each, then attack targets in D/T waves of
T weapons each.
2. Defense Using Local and Area Missiles
In the preceding discussion, it was assumed that
there is only cne type of defensive missile. A more real-
istic situation would be to allow two types of missiles: a
short-range local missile which defends single targets
(terminal defense) , and a longer range area missile which
can defend against weapons directed at one of a group of
targets in an extended region (area missiles) . Various
possibilities for defense using both local and area missiles
are considered here.
The simplest model involves the defense of a set of
targets of different values using DA area missiles which can
cover any target in the set and for which the defense has
the last move, and D local missiles which are allocated to
single targets prior to the attack. It is assumed that both
sides know the ether's stockpile size, and both weapons and
missiles are perfectly reliable. The offense is assumed to
attack a subset of the targets, each one with a number of
weapons proportional to its value, while the defense
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allocates lccal missiles in numbers also proportional tc
target value. The area missiles are allocated to targets
such that they destroy just enough of the weapons directed
at each target to let the remainder be destroyed by the
local irissiles defending that target. The optimum fraction
of total target value to be attacked is given by A^/DL if
A£ < Dk , where Aj* = A- (DA A)*' ; otherwise the offense attacks
the entire set cf targets. If the local defense covers only
a fraction h of target value instead of the entire set of
targets, A,* = A - DA {A*D,_ (1/h - 1)}*.
If instead of the missile reliability being egual to
1, it is assumed that t lccal missiles or s area missiles
a.
are required to kill a weapon, A* = A - (DA A/s) x , and the
optimum fraction of total target value attacked is tA*/D .
If the defense uses a preallocation strategy for
area missiles, and it is assumed that the targets have iden-
tical values, the missiles and weapons have perfect reli-
ability, and loth sides know the other's stockpile size, the
problem can be formulated as a continuous Blotto game by
allowing the cffense and defense allocations to vary contin-
uously. The local missiles are allocated evenly among the
targets. The allocation of area missiles and weapons
depends, however, on whether the offense or defense is
dominant.
If da, (a - dt /2) < (a - d^ )
2
where dA and dj, are the
number cf area and local missiles available per target, and
the offense is dominant and he attacks a typical target with
a^ weapons where a is ai random variable drawn from the
Uniform distribution U (dt , 2a-dt ). If, however,
d^fa - 0. 5d t ) > (a-dt ) , the defense becomes dominant, and
in this case, the offense should attack a target with
probability
2a/{d*+2dt * (£ + 2dA dl ) i }
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using a; weapons, where a; is a random variable from the
Onifori distribution U(d
t ,
d.t + da + Jd£ da d t ) . The defense
defends a target with probability
(1/3i)jdi* 2dft dl - (da /d t )
using d; area missiles, where d; is a random variable from
the Uniform distribution {0, d,,. + jd^, -t-d^ dj ) .
A further relaxation of the assumptions would be to
allow several non-overlappirg area defense regions, each
containing several point targets of different values v;
which are protected by local defenses as well. One-on-one
missile engagements are assumed, together with weapon kill
probatility being egual to 1. An approximate solution to
this nested allocation problem can be found if the offense
stockpile is assumed to be of infinite size, and weapons are
allocated tc minimize the cost in terms of weapons destroyed
per unit target value destroyed. The defense strategy is to
allocate area missiles among regions so that the offense
minimum cost per unit value destroyed is the same for every
sector. The local missiles are allocated among targets
within a region such that the minimum cost per unit value
killed is the same for every target in the region, ignoring
the contribution of the area missiles.
3. Budget Constrained Defen se Using Local and Area
Missiles
The models considered here differ from the previous
models in that the defense is given a fixed budget to divide
among local and area missiles. The optimization therefore
involves this division as well as the allocation of the two
types of missiles to the defense of targets. It is assumed
that the defense can purchase d area missiles per target
with his budget, and that the ratio of the cost of an area
missile to that of a local missile is k, both values being
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known to the offense. Both sides know the others stockpile
size, and a cre-on-one defense is used. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the weapons and missiles are perfectly reli-
able. Since the defense can use an attacker-oriented
strategy and save all targets with area missiles if d > a,
the analyses that follow assume d < a, and consider three
cases tased on specific assumptions about the area defense:
• defense-last-move strategy for area missiles,
• area defense strategy fcr area missiles, random weapon
arrivals, and
• area defense strategy for area missiles, controlled
weapon arrivals.
In the first case of defense-last-move for area
missiles, the defense has d-j area missiles per target and
jk local missiles per target, j = 0,1,. ..,d. If the offense
attacks a fraction i/(jk) cf the targets with ajk/i weapons
apiece, then jk of these weapons will be destroyed by local
missiles at each target attacked, leaving (a-i) jk/i weapons
to which area missiles are assigned. The offense can choose
i after observing the defense's choice of j. The optimal
strategies are found by differential calculus to be as
follows:
if 1 < a/d < k, j = d (1 - d/a) , i.e. allocate dz /a area
missiles per target, and i = a(1 - d/a), i.e. a fraction
a/(dk) of the targets are attacked.
In the case of random weapon arrivals, as each
weapon arrives, the defense assigns an area missile to it
without knowing which target is being attacked, until the
area missile stockpile is exhausted; then local missiles are
used. Beapon arrivals are rardom with respect to the targets
the weapons are directed against. Assuming independent
engagements of weapons by local missiles at different
targets, the probability that a weapon is intercepted ty an
area missile is (d-j) /a. If there are a+i weapons,
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i = 0,1,2,... allocated to a target, the probability that
exactly m of them are intercepted by area missiles is given
by the approximation
j_j x at;-*
p. = r:)(4r( |-T-)
No simple analytical solution to this problem can be
found; however the offense strategy i can be approximated by
dk-a+1 if d and k are small and d « a. If a > 3d/2, the
defense strategy j is approximated by d-1.
The model with controlled weapon arrivals is
similiar to the one analyzed previously except that in this
case, the offense can control the order of arrival of his
weapons on targets. The offense exhausts the area missile
stockpile with (d-j)T weapons, then attacks as many targets
as possible Kith (jk+1) weapons per target. The fraction of
targets to he attacked is determined by
i = max {0, a ( jk+1) / (a-d* j) - a} .
The optimal defense strategy is one of two extremes: all
local or all area missiles, according to whether 1/k is
greater than or less than a-d.
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IT. LA.TIR IHVESTIGATIOIS IHIC THE MISSILE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
A. ISTEODDC1I01
In Chapter 3, an overview of the studies done on the
missile allocation problem that are mentioned in the mono-
graph by Eckler and Burr was presented. This chapter gives a
survey of the investigations in this field conducted after
the monograph's publication, with material drawn from papers
published in scientific journals and postgraduate theses- A
list of these publications is given in the Reference section
of this thesis.
It is generally observed that the later investigations
into the missile allocation problem tend to model more real-
istic and hence lore complex scenarios of the battle, in
contrast to the situations presented in Chapter 3, which are
fairly simple models with a number of simplifying assump-
tions made to make the problem solvable. As a result, the
mathematical formulations cf the problem are not generally
amenable to solution in closed form, and various solution
techniques such as implicit enumeration algorithms, dynamic
progrimning techniques, linear and nonlinear programming
algorithms and other constrained optimization procedures
were utilized to obtain numerical results.
This survey of the recent literature on the missile
allocation prcblem is by no means comprehensive due to the
restrictions on the scope of the thesis given in Chapter 1.
However, the literature that was reviewed revealed a number
of interesting analytical approaches to the missile alloca-
tion problem in specific, and sometimes novel, situations.
The papers that were surveyed analyzed the missile allo-
cation problem from a number of different perspectives and
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used various analytical techniques. They can however be
loosely grouped for exposition purposes here according to
the specific scenario the mcdel seeks to represent, or to
the objectives that the defender or attacker seeks to
achieve, as follows:
strategies involving decoys,
strategies involving attacks on the defense system,
strategies involving specific types of defensive allo-
cations,
strategies involving targets of opportunity,
strategies with specific target assumptions,
strategic nuclear exchange situations,
strategies involving proportional defense, and
strategies in a game theoretic situation.
The studies will be presented in the following sections
under these scenarios.
B. SIB1TEGIIS IHTOLVIHG DECCYS
In Chapter 3, Section B.4, the problem of allocating
defensive missiles to a mixture of attacking weapons and
decoys was considered in the case where a limited capability
of the defense to distinguish between actual weapons and
decoys exists, expressed in terms of his knowledege of the
probability distributions fw (x) and fd (x) of some arbitrary
physical characteristic.
1« Defense Strateg y
Layno [Eef. 4] alsc considered the defense alloca-
tion against a mixture of weapons and decoys when the
defense is assuaed to possess a limited capability of
dis tiuguishirg tetween a weapon and a decoy, this capability
being quantified by the pr ctabilities of mistaking a decoy
for a weapon p, and mistaking a weapon for a decoy pz . The
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defense is assumed to know the total number of threat
objects, the number of defensive missiles available and
their kill probabilities, and the values of p, and pz . The
objective of the defense is tc minimize the expected total
number cf real weapons penetrating the defense, by finding
an optimal allocation of missiles against an incoming object
diagnosed as being a weapon and an object diagnosed as being
a decoy.
In the case where the defense has no discrimination
capability, the expected number of penetrating weapons can
be given by
L = A r (1-?) 1 (1-fy) ,
where Ar is the total number of attacking weapons, i is the
integer part cf d, the average number of missiles allocated
per attacking object, and f is the fractional part of d,
i.e. 3 = i*f . If the approximation 1-ff » C -^)^ is used,
then
L = Ar (1"f)
i+f
= ArO-jV .
In the case where the defense possesses a limited
discrimination capability, the average number of attacking
objects which are diagnosed as being weapons is
A^ = a r -px A r -frp, Aj , where Aj is the total number of incoming
decoys. Similarly, the number of objects diagnosed as teing
decoys can be given by
A
a
* = A^-p, A^+p^Ap . The expected number of penetrating
weapons in the limited discrimination case can be given by
l = A r {(i-p x ) (i-p)
Jr
+ vx a-fh .
where dr and dj are the numbers of missiles allocated to
each incoming object diagnosed as a weapon and a decoy
respectively.
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The problem of finding the values of dr and dd to
minimize I reduces to being a nonlinear program with a
linear constraint:
min A r {{1-]: 2 ) <1-j>)dr *p a d'ff'}
subject to AJdr * A] da = D ,
where E is the total number of missiles. The optimal solu-
tion jiven bv layno is:
dj = (fc-B)/ (m 1 *!) if (h-E)/(m' + 1) > 0, and otherwise;
and
d* = (t*m , B)/(a , *1) if dj* > 0, and b otherwise,
where b = E7A
r
f
, B = log {pa /m» (1-pa ) } /log (l-j*) and
m» = A//A» .
The solution is, however, net correct since B can become a
large negative number if pa is close to 1 , in which case
&f > 0, and d* could be negative if -mB > b. For example, if
A,! = 1, V * 2 ' P* = °- 9 -/ ?~ °- 6 # and D = U, then
d^* = 2.15 and d* = -0.31 using the above two equations.
The correct solution is as follows; letting
1- Q ~ e~* , the objective function becomes:





and using the lagrange Multiplier technique, the optimal
solutions are fcund to be:
a* = P/*)ln(*(1-pO/(*A,»)} , if = (1/rf)ln(p,*/{*A/)} .
where 7t is the lagrange Multiplier.
If * ( 1 -p a ) / (£v ) > 1 and *Pj/(£a/) > 1 , where
£ = expUArJlnUP-pO/A,!) A;in(*p»/A;) - *D) / (V +V) ) '
then 3* = (1/iiJlaW1-p,}/lil»J) , d* = ( 1 /* ) In {p>*/ (*a; ) } .
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Otherwise, suppose (I-Pij/A,! > px /A4* , then d* = D/A,!, and
djf = 3, and if {1-p»)/A r' < 2Z /&J
,
then dj = 0, and
djf = e/a;.
2- Offense Strateg y
Sverdlov [Bef, 5: pp. 183-264] considered this
subject within a different context. Whereas Layno analyzed
the problem frcm the defense's viewpoint, Sverdlov consid-
ered the protlem of deploying weapons and decoys in an
attack on targets utilizing the two effects that were
mentioned in Chapter 2, tamely the defense exhaustion
effect, and the saturation effect. In both cases, it is
assumed that the defender dees not possess any weapon-decoy
discrimination capability, and that the engagements are
one-oa-one. Ihe MOE used is the expected cost of killing the
value target, and the offense strategy consists of deciding
whether to fire a weapon or a decoy at each stage of the
game while the defense strategy consists of either inter-
cepting the incoming object with a missile or not. It is
assumed that there is perfect information to both sides
about the state of the process.
When the exhaustion effect is utilized, the offense
launches wave after wave until the single target is
destroyed. It is assumed that N missiles are available. If
the value of the game is 7W , the cost of destruction VN ,
measured in terns of the cost of destruction incurred if the
attacker uses real weapons crly, is given by
Vm = VM/{c*/(pg)} ,
where c R is the cost of a real weapon, p is the probability
that the weapon destroys the target given that it survived
interception by the defense, and g is the probability that
the weapon survives the intercept. Vm can be written in
recursive form as
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0.5 (E + 7N., + J B+7„-, -4cVw-.') , V. = q ,
with B = g-gre (1-p) , c = g-grc (1-pg) , rc = cp /c R , c, being
the cost of a decoy.
The solution to the problem can be stated as
follows: if M < N*, where N* = min (N: 7„ > 1-r c ), the
optimal offense strategy is randomized, characterized by the
probability that the attacker launches a real weapon,
The corresponding optimal defense strategy is also random-
ized and is characterized by the probability that the
defense fires at the incoming object,
Pj* = <V„ g,rc -g)/(7lJ -gV l ) -
Howevar for K > N*, the optimal strategies are pure: the
attaclcer always uses weapons and the defense always fires at
them.
When the saturation effect is utilized to overcome
the defense, the offense strategy consists of finding the
optimun number of decoys to accompany the real weapons in
each attack wave. Two cases are considered, firstly when the
attaclcer can launch only a single weapon mixed with decoys
in each wave, and secondly when the number of weapons is not
restricted to one.
In the first case, the expected cost of destruction
when i decoys accompany the single weapon is given by
c(m>) = (a,c, cR)/[p(1- <1-g)/{m, *1))
N
*}
where U5 is the number of defense systems protecting the
target, and each is assumed to act indepently of the others.
To minimize the expected cost, this expression is differen-
tiated with respect to m^ to obtain the following optimal
offense strategy:
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if g > N s / (Ns *rc ) , the optiial value m|t = 0, i.e. there is
no need to have decoys;.
if q < N3 /(N* -»-rc ) # m* is either £ m>] cr L m* ]+1 # depending en
whether c ([ m^ ]) is less than or greater than c(£m^]+1) f
where m£ is the positive root of the guadratic equation
c,m* c, {g+1-N$ (1-g)}mp c,g - cR Ns (1-g) = .
In the other case, where no restriction on the
number of real weapons m* per wave is imposed, but assuming
only one defense system is available, i.e. N5 = 1, the
minimum expected cost of destruction when the attacker is
constrained to launch a total of m objects at a time is
c*(m) = c^m min { (cK -c D ) m K + (1-p) (1-p*ni ft p (1-g) /m) c* (m) } .
I* »V4 m
Numerical procedures must be employed to solve this
eguaticn.
C. STBATEGIIS IHVOLVIHG ATTACKS OH TBE DEFEHSE SYSTEM
In the previous chapter, the problem of attacks on the
defense system itself was analysed essentially from the
defender's viewpoint under a variety of assumptions. In
contrast, Sverdlov [fief. 5: pp. 31-182] considers the
problem from the point of view of the attacker, who seeks to
allocate his weapons in a successive wave attack between
defense systems and a single value target such that various
objectives are achieved, e.g. maximizing the probability of
hitting the target, or maximizing the expected number of
penetrators. In solving fci the optimal strategies under
different sets of assumptiens, various applications of
stochastic dynaaic programming and game theory are employed.
In general, the sequential optimal attack on the defense
starts with attacks on the defense system (if the offense
stockpile is large enough) until the weapon stockpile is
reduced to M*, then the offense switches over to attack on
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the value target which is assumed to suffer 0-1 damage, and
continues until the weapon stockpile is depleted. It is not
feasible for the offense tc switch back to attacking the
defense system, hence only cne switchover at M* is optimal
and no switch is possible ficm an attack on a target to the
defense systen in an optimal policy.
In the case where the defense system comprises a single
point target (a defense target) , and the MOE used is the
probability cf hitting the value target, the optimal policy




Pp and P5 are the probabilities that an unintercepted weapon
destroys the value target and the defense target respec-
tively, and q is the probability a weapon will survive an
intercept by the defense system.
If the MCE is the expected number of penetrators, the
optimal policy is
M* = 1 £ 1/PS (1-g) ] .
When the problem is generalised to include Ns defense
systeas (and hence Ns defense targets) , and the assumption
is male that there is no collateral damage among targets and
the operatic*, of defense targets is independent, the optimal




M*(n) is non-increasing if the miss probability ratio f (n)
,
defined as
f(n) = C1-P P g(n)}/{1-Pr g{n-1)} ,
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is monotone increasing. Most weapon survival functions q do
not have the monotone miss probability ratio property, and
M*(N) is actually strictly monotone increasing, i.e.
M*(n+1) > M* (n) . In this case, an algorithm based on the
maximizing probability of hit criterion was derived for
solving M* (Ms ) .
If the MCE is to maximize the expected number of pene-




If g(a) is strictly concave, M* is non-increasing.
A special situation arises when the defense is assumed
to have the capability of switching to a cautious mode of
operation, in which the defense system becomes much less
vulnerable to attack, but at the same time is also much less
effective in intercepting attacking weapons. The defense is
assumed to consist of a single system, and possesses a
limited capability for discerning whether an incoming weapon
is aiied at a target or at the defense system itself. The
defense thus has fcur choices of action denoted as follows:
• P1S1: employ ordinary mode of operation (Mode 1)
regardless of the classification of an incoming weapon;
• P2S2: employ the cautious mode of operation (Mode 2)
regardless of the classification of the weapon;
• P1S2: employ Mode 1 if the weapon is discerned to be
aimed at a value target ('anti-primary* weapon) , and
3ode 2 if it is discerned to be aimed at the defense
system (•anti-secondary' weapon);
• P2S1: employ Mode 1 if the weapon is classified as
anti-secondary and Mcde 2 if it is classified as
anti-primary.
In any case, the probabilities that a weapon aimed at a
target and at the defense system is correctly classified by
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the defense are tf
p
and (Xs respectively, and the probabilities
of survival of the weapon when the defense uses the normal
mode and the secure mode are g, and q x respectively.
This problem can be formulated as a sequential game.
Since one player (the attacker) has only two pure actions
available to him, optimal randomized defense strategies




* 1- tf s no optimal defense strategy exists in which
P1S1 and P2S2 are the only •active' actions. If <Xf > 1- c<s ,
P1S1 is active in all optimal mixed strategies, and
conversely, if o< p < 1- p(3# P2S1 will be present in all optimal
mixed strategies.
The first value of M in which both players resort tc
randomized strategies instead of pure strategies (offense
attacks value target, defense uses P1S1 strategy) is the
M* of the one-sided dynamic programming model given above.
The general structure of the optimal defense and offense
strategies is as fellows:
• the numter of weapons H < M* : the optimal defense
strategy uses purely the normal mode of operation, and
the optiEal offense attacks value targets only;
• A* < H < M** : the optimal defense randomizes over P1S1
and P1S2, and the optimal offense randomizes over
attack on the value target and attack on the defense
system
;
• a > m** : the defense randomizes over P2S2, and the
offense randomizes over attack on value targets and
defense systems.
The value of M** can be calculated by the following set of
equations;
M** = iin{H: :i>2*, q M > (a «t n-a»b')/ ( (a"-a') -(b»-b») ) } ,
where t' = (g-g, ) / flfcg, P4 ,
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a' = (g-qi ) (1-q. ) ,
fc" = Cfla-g)/Cg. p5 (i-«i)} ,
a" = «g*-g-(1-«5)g,g»P3}/£g, *«<1-«*)} ,
9m = H-^ and g = * r g, - (1-*P )g 4 -
D- STBATEGIF.S INVOIVIHG SPECIFIC TYPES OF DEFENSE
AL1CCATICHS
In this section, situations involving models of partic-
ular defense systems are analyzed. The first concerns the
problem of overlapping area defense regions and the optimal
allocation of defensive missiles to protect targets within
these regions. In Chapter 3, the defense of targets with
local and area missiles was also considered, but only in the
case where the area defense regions are non-overlapping.
Another interesting problem that is considered here
concerns optimal defense and offense strategies when the
defense has a choice of allocating defense resources in
procuring 'numerically vulnerable' defense systems which are
easy to locate but difficult to destroy, or 'percentage
vulnerable' systems whichare relatively difficult to locate,
but once located can be easily destroyed.
The last model assuoes that the defense consists of
several 'layers' of defense systems, and that the attacker
has to survive all of these layers in order to reach the
target. The probability of an attacker penetrating all the
layers is analyzed.
1- Overlapping Area Defense Regions
Swinson, et. al. [Eef. 6] consider the problem of
overlapping area defense regions containing a number of
point targets of different values, and developed a procedure
that applies a dynamic programming algorithm within a
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general framework of successive approximations that allow
area lissile allocations to target 'sectors' to be optimized
sequentially within the constraint of the missile stockpile
size.
In the model, several area defense systems are
distributed throughout an area containing point targets of
different values. Each area defense covers a certain region
within which a subset of the targets are located. These
regions may intersect, and when they do, the union of these
regions may te decomposed by these intersections into non-
overlapping areas called 'sectors'. Targets in the sectors
are dafended by either a single area defense or several area
defenses. Associated with a given attack of a weapons
against target t is a function r^ (d-t) denoting the expected
value saved at the target if d missiles are allocated to
intercept the attacking weapcns. The function may be given
ty





where vt is the value of target t, p is the weapon kill
probability, g is the probability that the weapon survives
an engagement by a missile, and c* and ft are given by
ct = [dt/a t ] , f*. = at (c**1) - dt
The objective of the defense is to maximize the
expected total target value saved over all targets. If an
optimal wit hir-sector missile allocation policy is employed
to allocate a total of Dj missiles to the defense of the
T targets in sector j, then the total expected value saved
for sector j is given by:
t t
f) (Dj ) = max I r-t (d-t ) , wtere Z dt = Dj
This can be written in the standard functional eguation of
dynamic programming as:
fj,T(Ej) = *ax r T (d T ) fj,T-i (Dj -dT )
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which can be used recursively to find optimal missile allo-
cations within each sector given a total sector allocation
of DJ missiles. In order tc find a set of optimal missile
allocations to each sector, the expected total value saved
over all sectors F (x) = 2. f ; (.^xij) is to be maximized
subject to .2. x,j = b;, , i=1,.-.m, where n is the total
number cf sectors, xij is the number of missiles allocated
from area defense i to sectcr j, Ij is the set of indices of
the area defenses that cover sector j, J; is the set of
indices of the sectors that lie within the region of area
defense i, hi is the size of the missile stockpile at area
defense i, and m is the total number of area defenses. The
sequential optimization procedure developed runs as follows.
The missile stockpile of each area defense is first randomly
allocated ameng the sectors which it covers. The expected
total value saved as a result of this initial allocation x*
is then F (x* ) = Zf: (2.x;:). The allocations of all area
defenses other than a particular area defense k is then held
fixed, and the allocations Xkj
, j 6 jK of area defense k can
be determined using the standard dynamic programming tech-
nique to maximize the payoff
F (x) * Z fj (xkj I x'j ) >Zfj(£x*j ), subject to Zxkj= bK .
if k
Starting with the matrix of missile allocations xk resulting
from optimizing the allocations for area defense k, the next
area defense is optimized in the same way with the other
area defense allocations held fixed. This sequential opti-
mization procedure is repeated for all the area defenses
cyclically until an entire cycle passes within which no
sector payoff changes from that of the previous cycle, thus
indicating that a local maximum solution to the problem has
been found. A set of local maximum solutions can be gener-
ated by either varying the initial random allocation x* , or
by varying the order for optimizing the area defenses.
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Fur mar and Greenberg [Bef- 7] also analyzed the
attacker^s problem of allocating a fixed stockpile of
weapons of different types against targets of different
values that are protected by a number of overlapping area
defenses. It is assumed that only one weapon type can be
allocated to a particular target or area defense, and that a
target must first be rendered defenseless, i.e. the area
defenses that are protecting the target must first be
exhausted before a target can be attacked. The decisions
that the offense must make that constitute his allocation
stratagy can be represented by the following decision vari-
ables: the exhaustion strategy E, where k£ E means area
defense k is to be exhausted; the binary variable b„j which
indicates which weapon type j is used to exhaust area
defense k; the binary variable tij which indicates which
weapon type j is allocated to target i; and a;j giving the
number of weapons of type j that are allocated to target i.
The total payoff to the attacker can be defined as
T w
f (a) = Z I Dij (a;j)t,j
,
where T is the number of targets, N is the number of weapon
types, and Dij(a;j) is the collection of damage functions
representing the expected damage to target i when a weapons
of type j are allocated to it. D;j(a;j) can, for example, be
specifically a sguare root law damage function
D;j (a»j) = v; [1-(1+Cif/af )exp (-cjj/a^ )}
or a power law carnage function
Dij (a




where V; is the value of target i, and c,j is the damage
constant, a value between and 1, depending on the warhead
characteristics and certain measures of uncertainty.
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The coiplete mathematical programming formulation
for the offense weapon allocation protlem is
max f (a)
subject to Ec(1 # 2,...,D) , where D is the total number of
area defenses;
T
X a,-.- < w; , j =1,...,N, where W; is the number of
weapons of tjpe j available;
2:t.j < 1 , i=1....,T;
a.j =0 if j £ J;G i where J; is the index set of weapon
types to which the target i is exposed when using exhaustion
T
strategy E, and X "tjj a,j- + I bj,j]i u ; < wj , j = 1,...,N , where Xiy
is the number of weapons of type j required to exhaust area
defense k.
This problem can be partitioned and written as:
max {max f (x)} subject to the above constraints, where E is
chosen over all exhaustion strategies. The Lagrangian with
respect to the last constraint arout available weapon
resources can then be formulated, and the generalised
Lagrange Multiplier method used to solve the resulting
problem:
mi n a ax [max f (a)-I^a
1-jt,-j-|L
E
7ljb kjX uj+ \w} ,
where the multiplier Aj represents the price of a unit of
weapon type j.
For given A and E, the optimal values b*, a* and t*
can be found by simple enumeration, acd when the coverage of
each area defense is the same for each weapon type, the
optimal exhaustion strategy E* can be found (for a given
price vector A ) by finding the minimum-cut of a capacitated
network with vertices representing targets and area
defenses, and arcs representing the area defense coverages.
Details are given in the original paper of Furman and
Greenterg.
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In an earlier paper by Hiercourt and Soland
[Ref. 8] # an offensive optimization model is analyzed given
specific defense levels- In a later paper by Soland
£Bef. 9 ] # the optimization of the defensive allocations
giver an offense-last-move situation and optimal offense
allocation is considered. The scenario calls for a mixture
of overlapping area defenses as well as terminal defenses
with perfectly reliable missiles, and an upper limit on the
defensive stockpile sizes due to a budget constraint B. The
offense is assumed to possess a stockpile of size A of a
single type cf weapon that exacts a level of damage on an
undefended target (after its area and terminal defenses have
been exhausted) according tc the discrete concave and non-
decreasing damage function fj (a; ) , where aj is the number of
weapons directed against target j. The defense's allocation
problea consists of finding the optimum number of missiles d;
to allocate to area defense region i, i=1,...,m , and
optimum number of point defense missiles dj to assign to
target j, j = 1,...,T so as to minimize the maximum damage
the offense can inflict. If the number of weapons required
to exhaust the area defense region i and point defense of
target j are given by e t and e^ respectively, then a damage
pfunction g; can he defined such that g^ (aj , d^ ) =0 if
aj < e' , and gj (a^ ,d?) - fj {% -e- ) otherwise. The joint opti-
mization problem can then be formulated as follows:
min^ {max % gj (a; ,dj )}
subject to < dA < EA ,
< d p < E p ,
C(d* ,d/) < B ,
T " ^ AX a-. + Z oiei < A ,
T
and Z dij a- < A3; , i = 1,.-.,m ,
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where S: is an indicator variable such that Si = 1 if defense
of area i is to he exhausted and £ = otherwise- DA and D r
are the upper bounds on the number of area and point defense
missiles to be allocated, C(dA ,d ) is the total cost func-
tion associated with the defense allocation d and d r , and
dij is another indicator variable that equals 1 if the
defense of area i covers target j, and equals otherwise.
The last constraint ensures that no target is attacked
unless all area defenses covering it is to be exhausted.
This prcblem can be reformulated into a simpler form
by defining a function 0* (d* ,d f ) such that
0a = nax % g. (a, ,d- )
I "• r A
subject to T a\ Z diei < A
}*, * i»t
and Zdija; < l$„ , i = 1 , . . . , m .
$h can be calculated for given values of d and d by a
branch-and-bcund algorithm. The defenders problem can thus
be fornulated as
min i2fA(d\d p )
subject to C(dA ,df ) < B ,
< dA < E
A
, and
< dr < E
f
-
As a final step in the simplification process, the
upper bounds on the defense allocations are denoted by
Df = 2
P;
-1, and Dj = 2* -1,
where pj and q> are nonnegative integers. This involves no
less of generality because C (d. ,d ) for dt > D; for example
can be defined as being egual to infinity. New indicator
0-1 variables y*, i = 1,...,m, k = 1 # .-.,pc and Zj|
,
j = 1,..-,T, 1 = 1,... # qj are defined as follows:
df = (2*-1) - Z 2
r
y,k , i = 1 # ...,m ,
df = {2
1j
-1) -£2^ zH , j = 1,...,T .
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letting (y,z) = (y„ ,ya# . .. #y,j>„ , z„ ,z„,...,z»{.) to be the
new decision vector with Zc:+ !tg
;
binary components. the
defense allocation problem can be formulated as
min 0,*ly,z)
subject to C (y,z) < B .
Since it is assumed that jS* (y,z) is non-increasing and
C(y,z) is non-decreasing, this problem can be solved by the
Iawler-Eell enuneration algcrithm [ Eef . 10].
2- Percentage and Numerically Vulnerab le Defenses
Shere and Cohen [Ref. 11] analyzed the problem of
offense and defense resource allocations involving weapon
systei development costs ficm a game theoretic viewpoint.
Two classes cf defense systems are considered in the model:
• percentage vulnerable (PV) systems, e.g. Polaris subma-
rines, a fixed percentage of which comes under attack
fcr a fixed search effort by the attacker. Using random
search theory, the fraction of weapons surviving in the
ith PV system can be given by exp {-a;, (y^ -r^ ) } and its
value after an attack is
fi (*i ,yi ) = v t (Xi -g l )ezp{-al (y< -r ; ) } ,
where v
:
represents the value of the system (in terms
of destructive capability) , x; and y; are the total
amount cf funds allocated by the defense to the setting
up, and by the offense to the destruction of the ith PV
system, g^ and r^ are their reguired development costs
associated with the aforementioned purposes, and a;
represents the vulnerability of the ith system.
• numerically vulnerable (NV) systems, comprising of
essentially static weapon systems such as the Minuteman
ICBM system. The attacker's effort is distributed among
all the weapons of the system. In this case, the resi-
dual value of the jth NV system is
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*{l*fwlf) = v/ (xJ-g^expC-a.* (y/-r/)/(x/-g;)} .
The model assumes an offense-last-move situation
with countexforce targeting only. The objective of the
offense is tc minimize the retaliatory capability of the
defense. Conseguently , the defense allocates his financial
resources in a manner which maximizes this minimum. The
problem can thus be formulated as:
max min { Z f ; <x t ,
y
; ) + ? tfW , y.» )
)
subject to Z x ; + ? x-1 = X (defense's total resources),
Zj; Zy. 1 = Y (offense* s total resources) .
'<• j *
The authors developed an iterative algorithm to solve the
allocation problem for a mix of P? systems only by extending
the max-min thecry, and hypothesizing that if the offense
considers attacking the ith PV system, it will allocate
resources y; in excess of g; , its 'cost of admission* for
this system; the defense, if it decides to set up the ith PV
system, will similarly allocate funds x
:
in excess of the
system's development cost r; , so that it can procure at
least one weaken. If the choice of A is unigue for some
optimal allocation x = x*, then the optimal allocation x*
and y* is also a solution tc the game
max nin{ Z v L (x L -g; )exp(a L (Vi-r-,)) + 2 v t (x : -g- ) }
P K A J -fl
subject to X X; = X, T y; = Y ,
Xi > gi , i € E , y; > r ; , i 6 A ,
where A (i: y;* > r L ) , B = (i: x; > g;) ,
P = (x: Xi= for i £ B) , c* = (y: jL = for i $ A) ,
and y* and x* are the optimal offense and defense alloca-
tions respectively.
It can be proven that A = B if A is assumed unigue.
Hence the defense should net invest in a new PV system
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unless it is of sufficient value for the attacker to pay the
penalty for at least a limited counter to this new system.
A solution method for the allocation problem in the
case of a general mix of PV and NV defense systems was also
developed
. It was shown that at most one NV system should
be developed, and thus the problem reduces to the previous
problem concerning a mix of cnly PV systems with the amount
of investment in at most one NV system a parameter used to
deterjine the remaining amount of resources available to
allocate among the PV systems.
3* l§X§rj!.d Defense
Nunn, et. al. £Bef. 12] analyzed the missile allo-
cation problem in the situation where the defense is
layerad, and the attackers try to penetrate the several
layers of defense systems. An example of such a scenario may
be an ICBM defense system or a high-rate-of-f ire air defense
systea which adopts a shcct-look-shoot strategy against
attaching aircraft. The objective of the defense is to mini-
mize the expected number of penetrators.
The analysis uses a Markov chain formulation. No
explicit representation of defense force levels is given.
Instead, it is assumed that the numbers of attackers pene-
trating (i.e. surviving) the ith layer is binomially
distributed with parameters n
t , g t , where n t is the number
of attackers approaching the 1th layer, and gt is the prob-
ability that an attacker survives the 1th layer defense. The
passage through the 1th layer is viewed as a transition in a
Markov chain, with the associated transition matrix A whose
elements a are given as:
A^ is diagonalizable with AS = SD where S is a lower trian-
gular natrix whose non-zerc elements are those of Pascal's
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triangle, and D is a vector of the form
diag (1,q #g 2 #.-.,g n ). It is shown as a consequence that if
the distribution cf the initial number of attackers is T (a
rev vector whose elements make up the discrete mass function
of the initial cumber of attackers) , then the distribution
of survivors after penetrating through L layers of defense
is given by 1 JTA,, . The product TTA t is just another similiar
matrix with parameter TT g; - In the case where the initial
distribution T is binomial, that distribution is maintained
throughout the layers of defense. Moreover, the final
distribution cf attackers is independent of the ordering of
the defense layers since the transition matrices commute.
E. TAfiGETS CF CPPOHTOHITY
A unigue variation of the missile allocation problem
concerns so-called 'targets of opportunity 1 , which may be
value targets or incoming weapons. These targets of opportu-
nity arrive sequentially within a given time period, each
having a random value. In the case of value targets, the
problem concerns the allocation of defensive missiles to
protect these targets and weapons to destroy these targets.
In the case where the tarcets of opportunity are incoming
weapons, the problem consists of allocating defensive
missiles to intercept them. This class of problems can be
solved by dynaiic programming.
1- Sequentially Ar rivi ng Targets
Sakaguchi £Ref. 13] formulated a generalised two-
per son-2ero-sui game under the following assumptions: the
attacker has A weapons and the defender has D missiles. A
total of T targets arrive sequentially, each having a value
vj
, j = 1,... # T, from a probability distribution F (v) . The
allocation policy consists of a decision on whether to
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attacx (for the offense) or defend (for the defense) each
target as it arrives with a single weapon or missile, and is
based on the value of the arriving target, the number of
weapons (or missiles for the defender) remaining in the
stockpile, and the mission time remaining. The payoff for a
target of value v can be given by p(1-P)v if the defender
decidas to defend the target, or pv if the defender decides
not to defend this target. The optimal strategies can be
characterised by a system cf recursive difference equations
using a dynaiic programming formulation.
If the defense and offense have d missiles and a
weapons respectively left in their stockpiles, and there are
t targets yet tc arrive, the value of the game
Vi (a # d) = fValue jp(1-f)v+Vt-,(a-1,d-1) pv*V*_, (a-1 , d)j dF (v) ,r+V*_, a-1
with initial condition V (0,C) = 0, and boundary conditions
Vt <0,d) = 0, Vt (a,0) = p£ g«.i, < k < t ,
Vt (t,d) = tp;i - P5>£g*.i , < 1 < t , and
V* (a,t) = E(1-5, )
i5 g*,; . < k < t ,
where gt • , i = 1,...,t is a triangular array of positive
numbers defined by the recurrence relations
9t,i




= 5 F (g t -i, i ) -f(gt.j -g*-i.j ) for 2 < i < t-1,
The function S P (z) is given by z+T F (z), where T F (z)





and /i in the above eguation is the expected target value,
given as
>i = lp(0) = f xdF(x) .
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The optimal strategy for the defense and offense is
that of the latrix game in tie right hand side of the equa-
tions for Vt(a,d), if a target of value v arrives in state
(t, a,a"). The explicit solution of the game is not easily
solvable even for the simpliest kind of target value distri-
butions. However, if the simplifying assumption is made that
target value is deterministic having a value of 1, the value
of the game Vfc{a,d) = pa(1 - £d/t) . The optimal defense
strategy is to defend the target with with probability d/t,
and siniliarly, the optimal offense strategy is to attack
the target with probability a/t. A similiar continuous time
solution can be derived if the targets are assumed to arrive
according to a Fcisson process with rate 71, i.e. the number
of targets and their arrival times are assumed to be random.
In this case, the value of the game is given by a system of
recursive differential equations which characterizes the
optimal strategies of the offense and defense.
2. Randomly Arriving Weapons
Kisi [Bef. 14 J considered the problem of allocating
missiles against attacking weapons (attacker-oriented
defense strategy) which arrive randomly according to a
Poisson process with rate h - It is assumed that the defense
has a fixed stockpile d of aissiles with reliability ^ < 1,
and adopts a shoct-look-shcot strategy for each incoming
weapon. The defense allocation strategy consists of deciding
whether or net to engage an incoming weapon, and how many
missiles to fire given a limited number of missiles and
mission time remaining. It is assumed that the shoot-look-
shoot strategy is instantaneous, i.e. no time is wasted
between firings within a salvo. Each of the incoming weapons
have a randem value which is distributed according to a
Uniform (0, 1) distribution. The objective of the defense is
to iraximize the expected tctal value destroyed during a
given total mission duration.
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The number of weapcrs that are expected to arrive
during a mission time t is At, and the expected number of
weapons destroyed is 5>d. Hence, only a fraction fd/ {At) of
weapons can be destroyed , and the defense should only
select targets with high values greater than or egual to a
critical threshold value c. The optimal threshold c depends
on both the tine remaining t and the number of missiles
remaining d, and intuitively should increase as t increases,
and decrease as d increases. An optimal value function
f (t,d) is defined as the expected value destroyed when time
t and d missiles are remaining, and the optimal allocation
policy is employed by the defense throughout time t. Then
the optimal value of c is given by
c*{t,a) = £{f<t,d) - f(t,d-1)}
and an incoming weapon is allocated a missile so long as its
value v > c*. The optimal value function can be derived
exactly, and is given by the following recursive relation:
J-£{f(t,d) - (1-?}f (t,d-1)} =^r{£(t.a) - f(t,d-1) -j>}x for
d = 1,2,... with initial conditions f(t,0) = and
f (0,d) =0.
An approximate solution can be given in the form:
f <t,d) = j»|d - fj/{A(t-t e ))} ,
where fj = f JH + 1 + J2 $ t^-\ +l', and f„ = 0, U = 2/ A .
The difference between the exact optimal and approx-
imate solutions c*(t,d) is negligible for large t, but
increase as t becomes small. However the difference between
the values of f (t,d) in the two cases is negligible even for
small values of t.
Mastran and Thomas [Bef. 15] analyzed the same
problem of attacking targets of opportunity , however under
a different set of assumptions. Specifically, it is assumed
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that the defender can only attack one incoming weapon
throughout the mission time available, and that all missiles
will be expended in the intercept. A general probability
distribution cf weapon interarrival times is assumed instead
of the exponential interarrival times assumed earlier. The
conditional probability D; that there is an incoming weapon
in the next time interval given that the last arrival
occured i- 1 time intervals ago is given by
D; = 1i/(1-ZT: ) for i > 2 and D, = T,
where \„ is the probability that i time intervals separate
successive arrivals. The value of the incoming weapon v
comes from a general protability density function g (v) ,
instead of a Uniform (0,1) distribution. An optimal value
function f„ (i) is defined to be the expected value destroyed
when n time intervals remain, and i time intervals have
elapsed since the last weapon arrival, and the optimal
policy is used. A threshold weapon value K* that is varying
over time can be similiarly defined, such that the defense
will attack tte incoming weapon when n periods remain, if
and only if its value v is greater than Kn - Given that there
is an incoming weapon, the expected value destroyed for the
case *hen g (v) is continuous is
f«-« (1) I g (v)dv J vg(v)dv .
The function f„ (i) is maximized only when a weapon is
attached that has a higher value than would he obtained by
waiting another time interval and obtaining f„„,(1); hence
K* = f„.,(1)« Thus, the recursive relationship can be written
as
f«(i) = D
fc{J fnHd)g(v)dv *J vg(v)dv} + (1-D; ) {fn.,(i+ 1) } ,
with f, (i) = D:fvg(v)dv, and f c (i) = .
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Osing this dynamic programming formulation, the value of
f
rt (i) can be obtained fcr any n and i.
F. STBATEGIIS ilTH SPECIFIC TAfiGET ASSUMPTIONS
Thus far, tie values of targets are either assumed to be
identical or ncn-identical from some probability distribu-
tion. In this section, the missile allocation problem is
analyzed under some special assumptions on the target, viz.,
• deterioration of target value over time,
• ccaplemertary targets, and
• collateral damage between strategic and nonstrategic
targets
.
Each of these situations is discussed in the following
three subsections.
1 • Deter iorat i on of Ta rget Val ue over Time
Bracken and McGill [Eef. 16] treats the problem of
target value deterioration ever time, and seeks an optimal
sequential attack strategy to maximize the expected target
value destroyed. The model assumes a set of weapon launch
centers with different capabilities in terms of the maximum
number of weapons that can te launched at time t, where t is
discretized intc increments of equal length equal to the
time between successive weapon launches. The target set
consists of a number of point targets with different values
which decrease scnotonically over time. It is also assumed
that the flight times of the weapons from a weapon center to
a target is finite, and are different for each weapon
center-target pair. No explicit representation of defenses
t
is included; it is only implicitly represented by p& , the
probability that a weapon frcm launch center i hits target j
at tiie t. The conditional probability of destroying target




- TT(1-rJ )<* , j = 1,.-.T, t = 1,...,r ,
where a,j is tie number of weapons launched from weapon
center i to arrive at target j at time t, p is the total
number cf weapon centers, T is the total number of targets,
and r is a value large enough to allow all weapons to reach
their targets by time r.
It is assumed that the offense has a fixed total
attack capability in terms cf the number of weapons A that
can be allocated to the launch centers at each time incre-
ment t. Hence, if A; denotes the number of weapons available
at launch center i at each time increment , the constraints
f T * *{j
X Ai < A and 2. a,-: < M held, t;; being the weapon from
launch center i to target j. The objective of the offense is
then tc find optimum values cf a;j , i = 1,...,p, j = 1,...T,
t = 0,1,...,r and Mi, i = 1,...,p to maximize the expected
total value destroyed, i.e.
max I {Iv^/ TU1-P?)J
subject to the constraints 1 A; < A and T as 1 < Mi ,
where v* is the value of target j at time t.
If the target values are such that v* > vjt4 for
t = 0,1,...,r-1 (value nonincreasing ever time), the objec-
tive function is concave in the variables x^ , and since the
constraints are linear, the problem becomes a convex nonli-
near program which can be solved to yield a global solution.
2. Complementary Targe ts
Shubik and Weber [Ref. 17] considered a generaliza-
tion cf the classical Blotto game for allocating forces to
independent targets in the case of Complementary ' targets
or networks, where the value of a subset of targets v (s) is
not egual to the total individual target values, but depends
on the target configuration. In this case, the defender's
expected payoff can be given by
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Z (Tf;(d s ,a;) TT(1-£i (d; ,a;)}v(s) ,
where H is the set of all the targets, f; (d; ,a; ) is the
probability that the targets in subset S all survive, given
that the defense and offense allocations at target i are d;
and a; respectively. In the case where homogeneous offense
and defense resources are assumed, and the outcome function
fn(dk ,aK ) at the kth target is of the form
fk (dK#aR ) = 1 - fc/Ifc* (1-^)/km ) ,
where k = aK /d K (attacker tc defender force ratio) , and Y*
is a target parameter that represents its natural defensi-
tility, and m is a parameter that reflects the importance of
the relative difference in size between the attacking and
defeniing forces which have total resources A and D, the
force allocations are proportional to the
(fi ,fir -..fT ) (D,A)-value of the underlying game if both
sides have cptimal pure strategies, where T is the total
number of targets- Furthermore, for all sufficiently small
values of m, these allocaticrs are optimal.
3- Str ategic and N onstrate gic Tar gets
Grotte [Bef. 18] considered a plausible situation
where strategic (military) and nonstrategic (nonmilitary)
targets are colocated, and the objective is to employ coun-
terfocce targeting of weapons such that sufficient damage tc
strategic targets can be achieved without causing appreci-
able damage to the surrounding nonstrategic facilities. The
problem therefore consists cf finding an optimal allocation
cf weapons tc a set of aimpcints such that minimum levels of
damage to a set of military targets are achieved while
permissable levels of danage to a set of neighbouring
ncnmilitary targets are not surpassed.
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This problem can be formulated as a discrete nonli-
near program:
u
min Z g (z)?u
subject to f,»(z) > Cm, m = 1,...,M ,
g A (z) < dn , n = 1,...,M ,
J
Z zg < w- , i =1,...,! ,
where ff and N are the numbers of military and nonmilitary
targets, I is the number cf weapon types, and J is the
number cf pcssible weapon aimpoints, w; is the number of
weapons of type i available, and z,j is the number allocated
to aiipcint j, f„ (z) and gn (z) represent damage functions
for the military and nonmilitary targets, c„ and dn are the
minimatt acceptable and maximum permissable damage to mili-
tary target c ar.d nonmilitary target n, and A n is a nonnega-
tive weight for nonmilitary target n.
The solution to the problem is by implicit enumera-
tion based en the lexicographic technique of Lawler and
Bell.
G- SIEATEGIC IXCHAHGE EODEIS
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that a number of studies
on the missile allocation problem is done in the context of
a strategic nuclear exchange between two superpowers. In
this section, three such papers are presented which are
representative cf the studies done in this field. The first
paper formulates a general two-strike nuclear exchange as a
max-min problem, while the second proposed a model to opti-
mize defense allocations in crder to ensure a minimum level
of post-attack economic capacity. The last study optimizes
the allccaticn cf resources for population defense.
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1- General Two-Strike Nuclear Exchange
Bracken, Falk 5 Ciercourt [Bef. 19] present a
general foriulaticn of the two-strike strategic nuclear
exchange, in which both sides possess multiple weapon
systeas and value targets. It is assumed that the first
striker allocates all his weapons against his opponents
value targets and possibly against his strategic weapons in
an optimal countervalue-ccunterforce targeting mix. The
second striker then retaliates with all his surviving
weapons against the first striker's value targets. This
two-strike problem can be formulated in general as:
max min {E^U) - Dj (y) } ,
where X is the set of allocations Xij , denoting the number of
the first striker's type i warheads allocated the second
striker's type j resources, Y is the set of allocations yj
denoting the number of the second striker's surviving type j
warheads allocated against the opponent's value targets. D x
and Dx represent maximum value damage to the first and
second striker respectively from the opponent's weapon allo-
cation against his resources.
An appropriate function that is convex representing
the expected number of surviving second striker's warheads
is
n
i ** it qfi '
where n; is the total number of the second striker's
type j weapons, Wj is the number of warheads per
type j weapon of the second striker, and gjj is the single-
shot survival probability for the second striker's type j
weapon when attacked by a single type i warhead of the first
striker.
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On the assumption that Dj. is a non deer easing func-
tion, the solution to tie second striker's allocation
problei becomes simply
min {-D
x (y)} = max D x (y) = -D, (z) ,Y6YW y«YCrt
where 23 = Bj (x) , i.e. the second striker allocates all his
surviving weapons against the first striker's value targets.
The two-strike problem can thus be reformulated as:
max {Dj (x) - Dt (5) } subject to z > B (x) .
If the maximum value damage functions are assumed to
have the following specific forms
D
x
(x) = V, £1-exp(-Zfi (x,J)}, D 1 (yj = Vj (l-expf-fg. (Zj } ) }
,
where the functions f; and g^ are continuous and assumed to
be linear and X;# denotes allocations to value targets, the
two-strike exchange problem can be expressed as
max (V, -Vi ) - V»exp(-t,) Vx exp(-tx)
T
subjestto: 1. X;j <mi# i = 1 , • . . , I ,
}••
t, < I fi (xie ) ,
In zj > In nj wj Zx Jjln ^ /nj , j = 1,...,J ,
where ml is the number of the first striker's type i
warheads. This is eguivalent to a separable nonconvex
program, and an approximate global solution can be found by
applying a tranch-and-bound algorithm after replacing each
nonlinear function by a piecewise linear approximating func-
tion.
A later paper by Grctte [Bef. 20] expanded on this
model by considering four specific weapon types on each
side, namely: ICBM's, submarine launched ballistic missiles
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SL3M-at-sea, bombers, and SIBM-in-port, and deriving sepa-
rate agnations for the seccrd striker's surviving force of
these four weapon types after a first strike, which have as
parameters original force levels, reliabilities of the
attacking weapons, penetration and kill probabilities, etc.
The maximum value damage functions were specified as






where the parameters a.\. , u t , b; , vj are selected to repre-
sent the first and second striker's response to allocations
x and y. This more detailed problem was solved using the
same tranch-and-bcund algorithm after fcrming piecewise
linear approximations for each function in the separated
pro bleu.
2. Ensuring Post-Attack Production Capacitie s
Bracken 6 HcGill [Hef. 21] prcpose an economic model
of strategic defenses, and formulate a mathematical program
for allocating a minimum cost mix of defense resources to
geographical regions such that a specified minimum level of
economic production capacity will survive after an optimized
attack by the offense. It is assumed in the model that the
country is divided into geographical regions (defense
regions) with different economic sectors, each being charac-
terized by a Ccbb-Douglas production function of the form
Hij(Kij)" ,J (Lij)^ ,J where Hjj represents the technological effi-
ciency of eccnciric sector i in geographical region j, Kij is
the corresponding capital base, Lij the labor base, pCs and P{j
denote the elasticities of value added with respect to
capital and later respectively.
The post-attack production function (in terms of
value added) in sector i of region j can be given by:
P = HKL
where E = Wc {1 - (exp(-Z x ;" d ik )) (1 - exp(-2y" t ajO ) } ,
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F = K?*{1 - (exp(-i4 a> ).)d - exp(-|y£ a:;))}* ' ,
L = l|'J {1 - (exp(-f %n, d,* )} (1 - exp(-lyft ajll ))}'
,i,
,
where the standard Cobb-Douglas form has been modified tc
make the expression a function of the offense and defense
allocations, djk being the number of defense resources of
type k allocated to region j, k = 1,...,p, j = 1,...,n, and
ajt baing the number of weapons of type 1 targeted on region
j in an attack on econcnic sector i, i = 1,...,m,
1 = 1 y ...,g.
The parameters x-^ , x£ , and x fjV , j^ , y£ , and y;j"t
might be estioated from detailed analyses. Assuming that the
unit cost of defense resource k in region j is Cji , and the
required minimun level of jost-attack production capacity
for economic sector i is r; , the obective of the defense to
find an optimal (minimum cost) allocation of defense
resources tc geographical regions to ensure the surviv-
ability of a Dinimum level cf production capability can be
given by the mathematical picgram:
min i £ Cfcdfc
kx.1 j«| J* J*
A
subject to: nin ^. p,- > r; , i = 1,...,m ,
j*« J
n
and Z a^ < A t (the number of offensive weapons of type 1) .
This is a convex mathematical program with nonlinear
programs in the constraints, and can be solved by a SUMT
computer progran.
3. Population Defense ir a Nuclear At tack
Kupperman & Smith £Eef. 22] approached the problem
of optimal offense and defense strategies in a unique way in
their study cf the role cf population defense in mutual
deterence. Their model assumed that centres of destruction 1
are placed at random in a plane, forming a Poisson process
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of density m points per unit area, with a circle of area A
(area of destruction) centered at each of these points. The
probability that an arbitrary point in the plane will not be
covered by any of these circles would be the probability
that none of the points of the Poisscn process lies within a
circle cf area A centered at that point, which is exp (-mA)
.
If a value density v(x) is associated with points x in the
plane, and value is considered to be destroyed in regions
covered by the circles centered at the Poisson distributed
points, the expected remaining value density is v {exp (-mA) }
,
and conversely, the density cf destruction is v {1-exp (-mA) }
This formula yields a good approximation in the case where
weapons are delivered with random errors which are a
substantial fraction of their lethal radius. If this Poisson
type model is applied to compute the maximum destruction
inflicted on a circularly symmetric Normal value distribu-
tion, the maximum damage function can be given in the form
f (n) = 1 - (1+BfF JexpC-Bf? ) ,
where n is the number of weapons, and B is a parameter
constant. Ihis function gives a reasonably accurate repre-
sentation of maxinum net destruction for urban areas in the
US based on census data and weapons of less than one megaton
yield.
To ccipute optimal offense and defense strategies,
it is observed that the effect of an antimissile defense
would be to reduce the value of i, so that a general
destruction density of the form p = v {1-exp (-w. m.0) } is
obtained, with being a parameter between zero and one
reflecting bcth the deployment of the defense and its tech-
nical characteristics, and w is a parameter. Using a gener-
alization of Gibb*s Lemma and the concept of decreasing
marginal utility, an optimization of the defense to minimize
at fixed total cost the maximum destruction of value caused
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by an attack of fixed size is found. In essence, each
defense force is characterized by a value 7i such that th€
total defense stockpile D is given by
D = (Vw) J {wv(x)A " 1 - log (wv (x) /A) } dA (x) ,
and the defense allocation d (x) is given by
d (x) = (1/w) {wv(x)/>i -1 - log (wv(x)/7x)} , wv (x) > A ,
= otherwise
,
where the integral is taken over all points x such that
wv(x) > 7i . This strategy is optimal whatever the size of
the offense stockpile.
Ever j level of offense marginal utility )i <7l has a
unigue force level. The total attack size A is given by
A .JLJ(«MtfS -I *I*£)JAW*£JI*(*^)«W<.> ,
where the first integral is taken over all x such that
wv(x) > 7\ , and the second irtegral is taken over all x such
that }\> wv(x) > jim The payoff to the offense is
P = J <v(x) - /i/w)dA(x) ,
with the integral taken over all x such that v(x) > /i.
H. PHCFOBTICHAI DEFEHSE STBATEGIES
la the case where the defense is at a disadvantage, e.g.
when the offense has prior knowledge of the defense alloca-
tion before making his own allocation of weapons to targets
(of fense-last-move situation), the defense can 'insure*
against excessive losses by naking the defense proportional,
in the sense that the attacker must pay a •price* that is
proportional to the target value extracted.
A class of proportional defense models comprises the
so-called • Erim-Eead* missile deployments (named after their
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developers B.C. Prim and W.l. Read) , for defending against
an attack by an unknown number of independent and sequen-
tially arriving weapons, with the objective of minimizing
the total expected number cf defenders subject to an upper
bound on the maximum expected target value damaged per
attacker, i.e. the maximum possible damage under any attack
is bounded by a linear function of the attack size.
Burr, Falk and Karr £Eef. 23] developed a method to
produce globally optimum solutions of integer versions of a
class of problems whose continuous solutions are of the
Prim-3ead variety. It is assumed that the offense has the
last icve, and the target set consists of T point targets
with values v; , i = 1,...,T, each protected by its own inde-
pendent terminal defense. Ihe defensive missile has a reli-
ability o < 1, and the attacking weapon kill probability
p = 1.
The expected target value destroyed can then be given by
V
4a = i*l P- JM1-0-?)J,J )} ,
where a; is the number of weapons allocated to target i, and
d,-: is the number of missiles assigned at target i to be
directed at the jth incoming weapon, both numbers assumed to
be nonnegative integers. letting s denote the upper bound
on tha maximum expected target damage per attacker, this
defense problem can thus be formulated as:
min 2.% d;r
Aj ' j
subject to: V^ < s X a^
,
d;j > 0, ai > 0, d.] , ai integers .
For each value of s, the problem has a solution which
can be found by sclving a collection of single-target prob-
lems, one fcr each target in the target set. The single
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subject to: v (1 - TT(1-(1-P) J ) } < sk, k = 1,2,...,
j.i *
where dj is the number of missiles assigned to attacking
weapon j, and v is the value of the single target. It is
shown that for every r = s/v, there exists an optimal solu-
tion 3* such that d* > d* > d* >... .
The solution to this single-target problem can be given
in the form cf a recursive relation:
2 < k < 1/r, djf =k jQ-Ci-f)'
Ih (l-f )
with initial condition d* = ["{In r}/ {In (1-J) }1 ;
k > 1/r, d,* = 0.
([x] denotes th.e smallest integer > x .) The individual
optimal solutions to the single- target problems form the set
of optimal solutions to the original multi-target problem.
A different algorithm for the all-integer version of the
Prim-Read model was derived by Burr, which is similar in
nature to the above algorithm, but unlike this method,
always produces monotone deployments.
la the case where both defensive missiles and offensive
weapons are perfectly reliable, i.e. p = f = 1, the defender
can ensure destruction of the attacker by allocating a
single missile to it, and a target will be destroyed the
first time it is left undefended; hence the value of d can
be expressed as
d;j = 1 , j = 1 , . . . , Si
= 0, j = £ +1, <£ + 2,... ,
<£ being a nonnegative integer representing the number of
weapons against which target i will be defended and to which
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it is therefore invulnerable. This simplified problem can
thus be reformulated as:
min Z d;
subject to: v^ < s Z a; .
Ihe unique solution to this problem is given by:
£ = f(Vi/s) - 1*| , i = 1,2, ...,T.
Haaland £ signer £Bef. 24] derived optimal defense and
offense strategies using elementary mathematical techniques.
The assumptions ¥hich they nade in their model are that the
weapons and missiles are perfectly reliable, known to the
offense which, as before, has the last move. The damage
function at target i is dencted by fj (a;), and represents
the maximum danage inflicted on undefended target i (i.e.
its missile defenses having teen exhausted) by a weapons.
This function is assumed to be monotone increasing with
decreasing slope.
An example of such a function is the square root law
damage function.
The optimal attack strategy is shown to allocate a
number of weapons a to each target such that the marginal
increase in daiage by the last weapon is equal for all
targets, i.e.
fj (a; +1) - fi (a;) < c < f; (at ) - fj (a L -1) for all i ,
or ignoring integer value considerations, Bf ; (a;) /9a; = c,
where c is a constant denoting the marginal increase.
The criterion for not attacking a particular target j is
given by the inequality fj (ai) / (dj *a: ) < c , where dj is the
number of missiles defending target j. Hence, the optimal
attack strategy is obtained as follows: an arbitrary value
of c is chosen, and all values of a c are calculated using
the equation Sf; (a^J/da^ = c. Those targets for which there
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is bo solution to that equation are disregarded. The
criterion fcr not attacking a target is then applied to the
remaining targets, and the sum T (a; *d^ ) over all those
targets to te attacked is compared with the total offense
stockpile A. If Z(a; +d; ) > A, the procedure is repeated
with a larger value of c, and if Z (a; +d; ) < A, it is
repeated with a snaller value of c. The optimal strategy is
found when 2 (a; +d; ) = c. This tactic has the property that
a larger attack size A dees not decrease the number of
weapons aimed at a particular target, and would not cause a
target that is attacked at a smaller attack force level to
be bypassed.
The optimal defense strategy is analogous to the offense
strategy in that missiles are allocated to each target such
that the marginal increase in damage by the last weapon is
equal for all targets. This is determined principally by
their ability tc decrease the effect cf an attack in which
not all defended targets are attacked, since if A is much
greater than the defense stockpile D, the offense would
simply send in weapons to exhaust the defense stockpile D,
and then would allocate the rest of his weapons over any
targets he wishes, resulting in damages independent of the
defense allocation. The defense strategy is specified as
follows; an arbitrary B is chosen, and the number of weapons
allocated to undefended tarcet i, af is determined using the
equation
fi (a? 41) - fj(af) < B < fi <a?)-fi(a?-1) .
Then the defense allocation dt for each target is determined
from the equation
If fj {a*)/a*< B, dj is set tc 0, i.e. the target j is left
undefended. Then the sum cf the defense allocations are
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compared with the total defense stockpile D. If 2. d; < D, the
process is repeated with a saaller B, and if "5. d; > D, it is
repeated with a larger B. The optimal defense strategy is
found when 2 d; = D for a certain value of B- This defense
strategy is optimal when all targets are attacked. A * tuned
attack* is said to occur if the number of attacking weapons
as just equal to £ (d; a;), and in this case, all weapons
will be aimed at defended targets, and the total damage will
be B S (d; >af ) = BD.
I- S1BATEG1ES IN A GAME-THECRETIC SITUATION
Croucher [Bef. 25] uses game theory to analyse the
missile allocation problem. It is assumed that a target i is
attacked by a weapon carrying r; reentry vehicles, and is
defended by d; nissiles. Given this situation, the prob-
ability that an incoming weapon that is aimed at target i
destroys it can be given by a 'natural 1 payoff function of
the following fcrm:
P (ri ,d u ) = {1-exp(-a; r; )) exp (-b; d-t ) , where at and b; are
constants representing vulnerability factors associated with
target i.
If each target i has a value V; associated with it, then
the total expected target value destroyed is given by
p (r,d) = k *i {1-€xp(-a;ri )}exp(-bi dL ) ,
subject to the constraints Z r\ = B (the total offensive
stockpile of reentry vehicles), and .id; = D (the total
defense stockpile). The vectors r and d represent the
offense and defense strategies respectively. The function
P (r; ,3,) is ccncave in r ; for fixed d t and convex in di for
fixed r; ; consequently, it can be proven using the funda-
mental theorem of games that there exists a pure strategy
solution for the game with the payoff function P (r,d) . The
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optimal max-ain strategies r* and d* are derived using Gibbs
lemma to be as follows:
r,* ={1/bi}ln{1* (pfai ) / fta; ) } , d* = [1/a; ] In {v- / (u/a; + ?i/b ¥ }
if n* > 0, d* > , and
r.* = (1/b; )ln (Vi bi /a) if r;* > and d* = .
The values of 7y and ^u are uniquely determined by the equa-
tions:
I (1/b;)ln(vj bi/7\) 21 ln{1 + ;ibc / (fta; ) } = R
t>;
*• *• N k<
and I (1/a t )ln{vt /(u/a; h/b;
)
} = D .
* hi
The criterion for attacking or defending a target i is
characterized as follows:
no offense and defense at target i: r.* = d
;
* = if v <- ft/bj ;
no defense: r* > 0, d* = if Vb; < V; < {u/aj ) + (<Vb; ) ;
both offense and defense :r
;
*>0, d*>0 if v
;
> Oi/a^ ) (Vb;) .
A defense allocation &* > implies r
:
* > 0. The total
expected value destroyed when offense and defense are both
using their optimal strategies is given by the value of the
game
v = M 1/b; Z(v : - 7i/ti) ,
where I, is the index set i such that r* > 0, d.* > 0, and I z
is the index set i such that r.* > 0, d.* = 0.
In a later paper, Crcucher [Bef- 26] derives corre-




,d;) = 1 - exp£-bir
L
/(Ha t d L )} -
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On the condition that R < 2/nax b; , the optimal offense and
*
defense strategies are given by;
r* - {Vi b;^/(a l ?\i )}exp{bi^/(7ia;)} ,
&* = {vj b; /A}€xp{(b;>i/(aiA) - 1) /a; } if rf>0 and d.*>0 ,
and r* = (1/t-t ) log (v; b; /A) if r* > and d.* = .
Thus the criteria for attacking or defending a particular
target i is characterized by the following equations;
r* = a\* = o if v; < A/b; ;
if > , d;* = C if Vb; < Vi < (A/ti )exp[bi^/(aiA)} ;
r* > C , d* > if v; > (Vbi)exp{bi^/(ai7i)) .
The value of A and ,u is determined by the equations:
Z (1/b; )lcg(v; b; /fc) + Z. (bc v iyu/a;?f) exp (b;;a/a; 7l ) =R,
and I {(v; b;/>\)exp(b;/i/a;?t) - 1}/a; = D
The value of the game V is given by
V = Z»;{1 " exp(-bi,u/(a;;\))} Z (v; - Vb; )
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7. CCJC10SI0H
This thesis has attempted to provide a description cf
the missile allocation problem and a general survey of the
mathenatical investigations, models, and results related to
this problem. The treatments have not included classified
studies, weapon specific studies or computer simulation
combat models, and are hence by no means comprehensive. It
is hoped, however, that the reader who is interested in
missile defense and offense either from a practical or math-
ematical standpoint would, after reading this thesis, gain a
better appreciation of the range of problems involved in
this field, the successful attempts that have been made in
solving this problem, and the areas in which no solutions
have yet been found, and which therefore merit the attention
of mathematical analysts or operations analysts who are
interested in pursuing this field of research.
The general trend has been towards the building of more
realistic and aggregated itodels of missile offense and
defense. This is especially so in models which represent
national-level strategic exchanges between superpowers (see
for example [Bef. 27] ). However, as the degree of realism
and complexity of these models increase, it is generally
more difficult to obtain analytical solutions in closed form
or even through the use of iterative search algorithms, and
it seems that computer simulation offers the only hope for a
solution to the problem. However, simulation studies carry
with them the disadvantage that sensitivity analyses and
exploration of alternatives are extremely tedious and time-
consuming because of the large number of variables or param-
eters required to characterize the model. This would
hopefully motivate researchers to search for more 'elegant'
mathenatical solution methods for these problems.
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